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ABSTRACT

Recent progress in deep learning has enabled applications in many areas, such as business,
security, and science, that could impact our lives. Despite recent advances in these domains,
deep neural network models have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks and
lack of interpretability of their predictions. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate robust and
interpretable deep learning models and algorithms to solve the above issues.
In this dissertation, we proposed a series of algorithms for delivering robust and interpretable deep learning methods. To begin with, we study the problem of how to defend
against adversarial attacks with a purification-based algorithm called defense-VAE. Secondly,
we proposed GDPA, a patch attack algorithm that can be readily used in adversarial training. With this algorithm, we can train deep learning models that are robust to patch attacks.
Thirdly, we proposed an interpretation algorithm NICE, which learns sparse masks on input
images. We also showed how to use this interpretation algorithm for semantic compression on
images. Fourthly, we applied NICE on brain MRI data for the schizophrenia discrimination
task, in which we detected the important regions of the brain for schizophrenia discrimination. Lastly, we proposed the PSP algorithm, which applied parameter-wise smooth policy
in the PPO algorithm to improve the performance and robustness of reinforcement learning
(RL) agents.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable success in solving complex
prediction tasks. However, recent studies show that they are particularly vulnerable to
adversarial attacks Biggio et al. (2013); Papernot et al. (2016a); Szegedy et al. (2013) in the
form of small perturbations to inputs that lead DNNs to predict incorrect outputs. While
various defense algorithms Papernot et al. (2016c); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016b) have been
developed, they are later defeated by stronger attack methods Biggio et al. (2013); Papernot
et al. (2016a); Szegedy et al. (2013). Such unexpected behavior of deep neural network
models and potential security issue highlights the need to interpret the models themselves.
A new line of research in interpretable deep learning emerged and aimed to interpret the
behavior of such black-box models. This chapter presents a general introduction to robust
and interpretable deep learning areas.

1.1 Robust Deep Learning

Security and integrity of the applications posed great concern recently as the deep neural
networks make their way from research to the real world. For example, adversaries transform
input features craftily to make the transformed images imperceptible to humans but can fool
a trained deep neural network model into outputting incorrect predictions.
Since Szegedy et al. (2013) first discover that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
attack, the area of adversarial learning on deep neural networks has become a hotspot. The
adversarial attack methods can be divided into three categories according to different stages

of the target model: training stage attack, testing stage attack, and deployment stage attack.
We only describe the attack during the training stage and testing stage in this paper because
the testing stage attack and deployment stage attack are very similar.
The training stage attack, also called poison attack, refers to carrying out attacks by
modifying the training dataset, including input features and labels, during the training
process of the target model.
The testing stage attack refers to constructing adversarial examples by utilizing the
knowledge of parameters, structures, and algorithms of the target model. If adversaries
possess this knowledge when conducting the attack, it is called a white-box attack. On the
other hand, if the adversaries cannot obtain the target model’s information, they can train
a substitute model by querying the target model, which is called a black-box attack.

1.2 Interpretable Deep Learning

Due to that deep learning algorithms with the black-box property start to substitute the
previously entrusted decision-making process by humans, it is necessary for these deep learning models to interpret the decision by themselves. The mistrust between human and deep
learning models exists despite the success in a broad range of tasks: including computer vision, natural language processing, graph data analysis, etc. Moreover, deep neural networks
are found to be unreliable, biased, and not robust. This unexpected behavior highlights the
need to explain and interpret deep learning algorithms.
The purpose of the interpretability of deep learning models is to describe the internal

process of a model such that humans can understand the decision-making process. In other
words, we want to produce descriptions from the mechanism of the deep learning model that
is understandable by a human.

1.3 Relationship between Robustness and Interpretability

The robustness and interpretability have close connections in several aspects. Firstly, interpreting a deep learning model helps improve the model’s robustness. On the one hand,
if adversaries understand how the target model works, they can use it to discover model
weaknesses and conduct attacks accordingly. On the other hand, if model developers understand how the model operates, they may identify the vulnerability and find remediation in
advance. Some recent work involves interpretability in the analysis of adversarial robustness.
Secondly, many existing adversary learning works can be analyzed from another angle as the
extension of model interpretation. The methods of robust deep learning and interpretable
deep learning are overlapped significantly Liu et al. (2021).

1.4 Parameter-wise Robustness of Deep neural network

Most study on deep neural network robustness is about the vulnerability of DNNs against
input data corruption. However, the vulnerability of DNNs does not only exhibit in input
data. As functions of input data and model parameters, the parameters of neural networks
are a source of vulnerability. For neural networks deployed on electronic computers, parameter attacks can be conducted as training data poisoning, bit flipping, compression, or
quantization. Suppose the neural network is deployed in physical devices. In this case, ad-

vances in hardware neural networks also call for a study on parameter robustness because
of hardware damage and environmental noise, which is parameter corruption. Furthermore,
a study on parameter robustness can improve our understanding of different mechanisms in
neural networks, inspiring innovation in architecture design and the training process.

1.5 Robust Reinforcement Learning

Combining the power of classic reinforcement learning algorithms and modern deep neural
network techniques, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is capable of training agents for
complex tasks with inputs of high dimensional observations, such as pixels Mnih et al.
(2013). It has proven that DRL is successful across a wide range of problems, including
game playing Mnih et al. (2013); Silver et al. (2016, 2017); Vinyals et al. (2019), robot
control Tai et al. (2018, 2017); Zhelo et al. (2018); Hwangbo et al. (2019), natural language
processing Hudson & Manning (2018); Wang et al. (2018); Wu et al. (2018), autonomous
driving Talpaert et al. (2019); Milz et al. (2018); Li et al. (2020), and recommendation
systems Zheng et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2019c), etc.
Despite achieving excellent performance with DRL on various tasks, the presence of
adversarial examples in DNNs and many successful attacks on DRL encourages us to study
robust DRL algorithms. When an RL agent obtains its current observations, it may contain
uncertainty that originates naturally from unavoidable sensor errors or equipment inaccuracy.
A policy not robust to such uncertainty can lead to destructive failures. For this reason,
training a robust policy is crucial to the RL algorithms.

1.6 Dissertation Organization

The overall structure of this dissertation is organized as below. To begin with, we briefly
introduce robust deep learning and interpretable deep learning in Chapter 1. From Chapter 2
to Chapter 6, we present five algorithms on robust and interpretable deep learning.
Chapter 2 proposes a simple yet effective defense algorithm Defense-VAE that uses variational autoencoder (VAE) to purge adversarial perturbations from contaminated images.
The proposed method is generic and can defend white-box and black-box attacks without
retraining the original CNN classifiers. It can further strengthen the defense by retraining
CNN or end-to-end finetuning the whole pipeline. In addition, the proposed method is very
efficient compared to the optimization-based alternatives, such as Defense-GAN, since no
iterative optimization is needed for online prediction.
Chapter 3 proposes an end-to-end patch attack algorithm, Generative Dynamic Patch
Attack (GDPA), which generates both patch pattern and patch location adversarially for each
input image. First, we show that GDPA is a generic attack framework that can produce
dynamic/static and visible/invisible patches with a few configuration changes. Secondly,
GDPA can be readily integrated into adversarial training to improve model robustness to
various adversarial attacks.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel end-to-end Neural Image Compression and Explanation
(NICE) framework that learns to (1) explain the predictions of convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) and (2) subsequently compress the input images for efficient storage or transmission.
Specifically, NICE generates a sparse mask over an input image by attaching a stochastic

binary gate to each pixel of the image, whose parameters are learned through the interaction
with the CNN classifier to be explained. The generated mask is able to capture the saliency
of each pixel measured by its influence on the final prediction of CNN; it can also be used
to produce a mixed-resolution image, where important pixels maintain their original high
resolution and insignificant background pixels are subsampled to a low resolution.
Chapter 5 introduces a sparse deep neural network (DNN) approach to identify sparse
and interpretable features for schizophrenia (SZ) discrimination. An L0 regularization is
implemented on the network’s input layer for sparse feature selection, which can later be
interpreted based on importance weights. We applied the proposed approach on a large
multi-study cohort (N = 1,684) with gray matter volume (GMV) and single nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP) data for SZ discrimination.
Chapter 6 proposes to train a parameter-wise smooth policy network in PPO to tackle
these challenges. Specifically, we introduce a Parameter-wise Smooth Policy (PSP) regularization to enforce the outputs of a policy or loss values not to change much when injecting
small perturbations to the parameters of policy networks. With the PSP regularization,
we improve the stability of PPO and promote sample efficiency by learning policies with
high entropy outputs for exploration, thus improving the cumulative rewards. Furthermore,
models trained with our PSP regularization are more robust against random and adversarial
parameter corruption.
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CHAPTER 2
Defense-VAE: A Fast and Accurate Defense against Adversarial Attacks

2.1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable success in solving complex
prediction tasks. However, recent studies show that they are particularly vulnerable to
adversarial attacks Biggio et al. (2013); Papernot et al. (2016a); Szegedy et al. (2013) in
the form of small perturbations to inputs that lead DNNs to predict incorrect outputs. For
images, such perturbations are often almost imperceptible to human vision system, while
being very effective at fooling DNN-based systems. Both white-box attacks Papernot et al.
(2016b) and black-box attacks Papernot et al. (2017) have been proposed to attack DNNs,
and they can often fool the network with high probabilities. These attacks pose a serious
threat to the applications of DNNs in security-sensitive systems, e.g., identity authentication
surveillance, self-driving cars, malware detection, and voice command recognition. As a
result, it is critical to develop effective and efficient defense mechanisms to counter adversarial
attacks.
In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective defense algorithm called Defense-VAE
which uses Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) Kingma & Welling (2013); Rezende et al. (2014)
to purge the adversarial perturbations from contaminated images before feeding the images
to the downstream CNN classifiers. To illustrate the idea, we generate some adversarial
images based on the FGSM attack Goodfellow et al. (2014b) with ϵ = 0.05 and ϵ = 0.1
on four popular image classification benchmarks: MNIST Lecun et al. (1998), Fashion-
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Figure 2.1 Defense-VAE purges adversarial perturbations from contaminated images. Example images are from (left top) MNIST, (right top) Fashion MNIST, (left bottom) CIFAR-10,
and (right bottom) CelebA. FGSM Goodfellow et al. (2014b) with ϵ = 0.05 and ϵ = 0.1 are
used to generate the adversarial attacks.
MNIST Xiao et al. (2017), CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky (2009) and CelebA Liu et al. (2015). These
adversarial images are then fed into Defense-VAE for reconstruction. Figure 2.1 illustrates
some of the typical examples from Defense-VAE. As we can see, the Defense-VAE generated
images are the faithful reconstructions from the underlying clean images, with the majority of
adversarial perturbations removed. As we will demonstrate later, such reconstructed images

can recover almost all the accuracy losses due to adversarial attacks, without introducing
much computation overhead compared to Defense-GAN Samangouei et al. (2018), a closely
related state-of-the-art defense algorithm that is based on Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN) Goodfellow et al. (2014a).
Compared with the state-of-the-art defense algorithms, our method has the following
properties:
• Defense-VAE is very generic and can defend both white-box attacks and black-box
attacks without the need of retraining the original CNN classifiers, and can further
strengthen the defense by retraining or end-to-end finetuning;
• Defense-VAE achieves much higher accuracy than the state-of-the-art defense algorithms on white-box and black-box attacks. Especially, it outperforms Defense-GAN
by about 30% in defending black-box attacks on Fashion-MNIST;
• Defense-VAE is very efficient compared to the optimization-based alternatives, such as
Defense-GAN, as no iterative optimization is needed for online prediction. From our
experiments, it shows that Defense-VAE is about 50x faster than Defense-GAN. This
makes our method widely deployable in real-time security-sensitive applications.
A preliminary ECML workshop version of this work was presented earlier Li & Ji (2019).
The present work adds to the initial version in significant ways. First, we give an in-depth
introduction to Defense-VAE to set up the context to readers. Second, we extend DefenseVAE for adversarial image detection, which allows a flexible integration of Defense-VAE with

other defense algorithms to form a defense pipeline, where Defense-VAE can be a component
for adversarial detection or adversarial defense or both. Third, we examine the robustness
of our model under all sorts of untrained attacks, demonstrating the robustness of DefenseVAE can be solidified by incorporating more adversarial examples from diverse attacking
algorithms. Experimentally, we provide more results on black-box defense, adversarial detection and robustness validation. We also provide more details on network architectures
and experimental configurations for reproducible research.

2.2 Defense-VAE: The Proposed Algorithm

At a high level, Defense-VAE is a defense algorithm that is based on deep generative models
for image reconstruction. That is, given an adversarial image as input, the generative model
attempts to produce a denoised image that is closely related to the underlying clean image,
with the adversarial perturbations removed. As the name suggested, Defense-VAE is built
upon Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) Kingma & Welling (2013); Rezende et al. (2014).
Therefore, we first give a brief introduction to VAE.

2.2.1 Variational Auto-Encoder
Variational Autoencoder (VAE) Kingma & Welling (2013); Rezende et al. (2014) is one of the
most powerful deep generative models that is based on latent variable models. It consists of
an encoder network to encode an input image to the latent variable z and a decoder network

to decode the latent variable z back to the image domain:

z ∼ Enc(x) = q(z|x),

x ∼ Dec(z) = p(x|z).

(2.1)

Since the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of this latent variable model is intractable, a
variational lower bound (ELBO) is optimized instead:

LVAE = −Eq(z|x)



p(x|z)p(z)
log
q(z|x)


(2.2)

= −Eq(z|x) [log p(x|z)] + DKL (q(z|x)∥p(z))

where the first term is the reconstruction error and the second term is a regularization
that prefers the posterior to be close to the prior. Typically, a simple unit Gaussian prior is
assumed in VAE. To facilitate efficient computation, a diagonal covariance Gaussian posterior
is further assumed, which enables the use of the reparameterization trick to reduce the
variance of Monte-Carlo sampling Kingma & Welling (2013).
As a generative model, VAE can generate high quality images that follow the similar
distribution of the training images.

2.2.2 Defense-VAE
VAE is typically trained to reproduce the same image from an input image. As for adversarial
defense, reproducing the same adversarial images is an undesirable task as the adversarial
perturbations may be preserved during the image reconstruction. Instead, in Defense-VAE,
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we modify the encoder and the decoder of the latent variable model as follows:

z ∼ Enc(x̂) = q(z|x̂),

x ∼ Dec(z) = p(x|z),

(2.3)

where x̂ = x + δ is an adversarial image with the perturbation δ added on top of a clean
image x. This adversarial image is encoded to a latent variable z, which is decoded to
the underlying clean image x. Accordingly, the training loss of Defense-VAE is updated as

follows:

LDefense−VAE = −Eq(z|x̂)



p(x|z)p(z)
log
q(z|x̂)


(2.4)

= −Eq(z|x̂) [log p(x|z)] + DKL (q(z|x̂)∥p(z)),

where the input to Defense-VAE is an adversarial image x̂ = x + δ, and the expected
output is the underlying clean image x. The compatibility between input and output pair
is measured by the loss function 2.4.
To train the Defense-VAE model, we can generate adversarial images given any clean
image from a training set. Since there are many different adversarial attack algorithms and
for each attack algorithm we can generate multiple adversarial images with different configurations, we can in principle generate an unlimited amount of training pairs for Defense-VAE,
i.e., multiple adversarial images can be mapped to one clean image. The detailed training
pipeline is demonstrated in Figure 2.2 (left). Being an effective approach of generating sufficient training pairs for Defense-VAE, using multiple attack algorithms to produce adversarial
training examples will also boost the capability of Defense-VAE to counter an ensemble of
adversarial attacks and make Defense-VAE a generic defense algorithm that is robust to
a wide range of attacks. As we will discuss later, this ensemble training strategy entails
Defense-VAE superior defense capability over Defense-GAN.
Once the Defense-VAE model is trained, we can also use the reconstructed images from
Defense-VAE to retrain the downstream CNN classifiers Figure 2.2 (right). As we will see

later, the retrained CNN classifier can further boost the defense accuracy over the original
CNN classifier.
We can also train the whole pipeline end to end from scratch or finetuning from pretrained VAE and CNN classifier by optimizing the joint loss function:

LEnd−to−End = LDefense−VAE + λLCross−Entropy .

(2.5)

As we will see from the experiments, this end-to-end training can boost the defense accuracy
even further.
After training the Defense-VAE model and potentially retraining CNN classifiers or endto-end finetuning the whole pipeline, we can use the trained Defense-VAE to purge the
adversarial perturbations from any contaminated images, and the reconstructed images are
then fed to the original CNN classifier or retrained CNN classifier for the final image classification. This test pipeline is shown in Figure 2.3.

2.3 Related Work

Adversarial attacks and defenses is one of the active research areas in deep learning, with
tens of different attack and defense algorithms developed in the past few years. For a general
introduction to this exciting research area and the related terminologies, we refer the readers
to Vorobeychik & Kantarcioglu (2018); Yuan et al. (2017); Samangouei et al. (2018) for
more details. Here we will focus on the defense algorithms that are most closely related to
Defense-VAE.

Defending against adversarial attacks is a challenging task. Different types of defense
algorithms Papernot et al. (2016c); Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016b) have been proposed in the
past few years. The first type of defense algorithms Dziugaite et al. (2016); Guo et al. (2017a);
Luo et al. (2015a) augments the training data to make the DNN model resillient to the trained
adversarial attacks. The second type of defense algorithms Gu & Rigazio (2014a); Ross &
Doshi-Velez (2017); Lyu et al. (2015a); Nguyen et al. (2017); Nayebi & Ganguli (2017); Gao
et al. (2017) modifies the training process by introducing regularization to the objective
functions. The third type of defense algorithms Akhtar et al. (2017); Xu et al. (2018); Guo
et al. (2017b) attempts to remove the adversarial perturbations via input transformations
before feeding the image to the classifier. According to this categorization, our DefenseVAE belongs to the input transformation based defense approach. In the following, we will
therefore review the defense algorithms that are closely related to our work.
Adversarial training Goodfellow et al. (2014b); Kurakin et al. (2016) is a popular and
well investigated defense approach against adversarial attacks. It attempts to use adversarial
images as data augmentation to train a robust classifier. It shows that this method can improve the defense accuracy effectively and sometimes it can even improve the accuracy upon
the model trained only on the original clean training set. However, this defense mechanism
is more effective in white-box attacks than in black-box attacks due to the gradient masking
problem. In Defense-VAE, we also use adversarial examples to improve the robustness of
the defense model. However, instead of improving the targeted CNN classifiers directly, adversarial training is used to train a Defense-VAE model to purge adversarial perturbations

for the downstream CNN classifiers.
Magnet propsed by Meng and Chen Meng & Chen (2017) is another effective strategy
to defend adversarial attacks. Magnet has two phases for defense: detector network and
reformer network. Detector network learns the manifold of the normal clean images so that
it can detect if an input image is an adversarial. If an image is detected as an adversarial,
it will be forwarded to the reformer network, which will modify the adversarial image to the
manifold of normal images. In Magnet, the reformer network is trained only on clean images
with the goal of reconstructing the same clean input images, while Defense-VAE is trained
on adversarial and clean image pairs with the goal of removing the adversarial perturbations
from the contaminated images.
Another closely related work is Defense-GAN that is proposed by Samangouei et. al.
in Samangouei et al. (2018), where a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) Goodfellow
et al. (2014a) is used to reconstruct a clean image from an adversarial image. Defense-GAN
firstly trains a GAN model purely on a training set of clean images, and as such it learns
the distribution of the normal images. Then given an adversarial image, multiple iterations
of back-propagations are used to identify a proper z from the clean image latent space,
such that after decoded through the GAN generator, the reconstructed image is expected to
be as close as possible to the adversarial image. Given the non-convex loss function of the
GAN generator model, multiple random z’s are used to initialize the back-propagation image
search. Typically, given an adversarial image, Defense-GAN needs to perform L iterations
of back-propagation for each of R random initializations, with the typical values of L = 200

and R = 10. As a comparison, to reconstruction a clean image, Defense-VAE can directly
identify a proper z by forward-propagating an adversarial image through the VAE encoder
network, and the z is subsequently used to reconstruct a clean image through the VAEdecoder network. No expensive iterative online optimization is needed in Defense-VAE. As
we will discuss later, such reconstructed images are not only more accurate, but the whole
process is much faster than Defense-GAN.

2.4 Experiments

The details of network architectures used in our experiments are described below. Table 2.1
shows the architectures of the CNN classifiers and their substitute models, which are identical
to those used in the Defense-GAN paper Samangouei et al. (2018). This is for the purpose of
fair comparison since we compare our method mainly with Defense-GAN Samangouei et al.
(2018). The meanings of the notations used in the tables are described below:
- Conv(C1 , C2 , K, S, P ) refers to a convolutional layer with input channel C1 , output
channel C2 , filter size K, stride S and padding P . If C1 is *, it equals to 1 for gray
images and 3 for RGB images.
- ConvT(C1 , C2 , K, S, P ) refers to a transposed convolutional layer with input channel
C1 , output channel C2 , filter size K, stride S and padding P .
- FC(M, N ) refers to a fully-connected layer with M inputs and N outputs.
- Dropout(P ) refers to a dropout layer with dropout probability P .

- ReLU refers to the Rectified Linear Unit activation.
- BN refers to a Batch Normalization layer.
Table 2.2 shows the architecture of the Defense-VAE model used in the experiments on
MNIST and Fashon-MNIST. The Defense-VAE architecture used for CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky
(2009) is largely the same except that it has one additional convolutional layer of Conv(64, 64,
4, 2, 1) in the encoder and one additional transposed convolutional layer of ConvT(64, 64, 4,
2, 1) in the decoder due to the different size of input images compared with MNIST. Similarly,
the VAE architecture used for CelebA Liu et al. (2015) has two additional convolutional layers
of Conv(64, 64, 4, 2, 1) in the encoder and two additional transposed convolutional layers
of ConvT(64, 64, 4, 2, 1) in the decoder. Additionally, we don’t use Batch Normalization in
the experiments on CIFAR-10 and CelebA.
A
Conv(*, 64, 5, 1, 2)
ReLU
Conv(64, 64, 5, 2, 0)
ReLU
Dropout(0.25)
FC(128)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax

B
Dropout(0.2)
Conv(*, 64, 8, 2, 5)
ReLU
Conv(64, 128, 6, 2, 0)
ReLU
Conv(128, 128, 5, 1, 0)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax

C
Conv(*, 128, 3, 1, 1)
ReLU
Conv(128, 64, 5, 2, 0)
ReLU
Dropout(0.25)
FC(128)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax

D
FC(200)
ReLU
Dropout(0.5)
FC(200)
ReLU
Dropout(0.25)
FC(10) + Softmax

E
FC(200)
ReLU
FC(200)
ReLU
FC(10) + Softmax

Table 2.1 The architectures of the classifiers and the substitute models used in the white-box
and black-box attacks.

We validate our algorithm on four popular image classification benchmarks: MNIST Lecun et al. (1998), Fashion-MNIST Xiao et al. (2017), CelebA Liu et al. (2015) and CIFAR10 Krizhevsky (2009). MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are two gray-level image datasets, each
containing 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images with the size of 28 × 28. While

Encoder
Conv(*, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU
Conv(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU
Conv(64, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
Conv(128, 256, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
FC1(4096, 128), FC2(4096, 128)

Decoder
FC(128, 4096) + ReLU
ConvT(256, 128, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
ConvT(128, 64, 4, 2, 1) + BN + ReLU
ConvT(64, 64, 4, 2, 3) + BN + ReLU
ConvT(64, 64, 5, 1, 2) + BN + ReLU

Table 2.2 The encoder and decoder of Defense-VAE used in the experiments on MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST.
MNIST consists of 10 hand-written digits, Fashion-MNIST contains 10 different articles, e.g.,
shoes, shirts, etc. CelebA contains 202,599 RGB images of human faces, split into training
and test sets. We use this dataset for binary classification to distinguish if a face image is
from a male or a female. CIFAR-10 contains 10 classes of RGB images of the size of 32 × 32,
in which 50,000 images are for training and 10,000 images are for test.
We consider both the white-box attacks and the black-box attacks to test the defense
performance of our algorithm. For the white-box attacks, FGSM Goodfellow et al. (2014b),
Randomized FGSM Kurakin et al. (2016), and CW Carlini & Wagner (2017) attacks are
used. For the black-box attacks, we train a substitute model to generate adversarial images
to attack the targeted CNN classifiers. For a fair comparison, our experimental setups closely
follow those of Defense-GAN 1 .
To demonstrate the generalization of our algorithm, we test our algorithms with the
targeted CNN classifiers of different architectures: different number of convoluational or
full-connected layers, different convolution parameters, and with/without dropout or batch
normalization. For the black-box attacks, different architectures are also considered for the
substitute models. When we present results, we denote the targeted model as A, B, C, D
1

https://github.com/kabkabm/defensegan

and the substitute model as B, E.
For the defense algorithms, we compare our algorithm with Adversarial Training Goodfellow et al. (2014b); Kurakin et al. (2016), MagNet Meng & Chen (2017) and DefenseGAN Samangouei et al. (2018). All of our experiments are performed on NVIDIA Titan-Xp
GPUs.

2.4.1 Results on White-box Attacks
Classifier
Model
A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
D
RAND A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
α = 0.05 D
A
CW
B
l2 norm C
D
Average
Attack

No
Attack
90.85
71.62
90.78
86.94
90.85
71.62
90.78
86.94
90.85
71.62
90.78
86.94
84.05

No
Defense
9.18
15.89
8.68
8.51
7.91
13.14
5.48
7.79
11.67
18.74
7.70
9.35
10.34

Defense
VAE
86.9
70.88
85.8
85.36
86.42
71.12
86.42
85.77
81.81
67.43
78.64
64.38
79.24

Defense
VAE-REC
89.03
74.41
89.72
87.09
88.91
73.91
89.38
87.18
86.99
73.69
87.47
86.21
84.50

Defense
VAE-E2E
91.02
77.86
90.85
89.26
90.57
77.09
90.28
88.97
88.54
74.72
88.69
87.83
86.31

Defense
GAN
87.9
62.9
89.6
87.5
88.8
66.1
89.3
86.2
89.6
65.6
89.6
87.5
82.55

MagNet
8.9
16.8
11.0
9.9
9.6
16.1
11.2
10.4
6.0
13.1
8.4
6.9
10.69

Adv. Tr.
ϵ = 0.3
79.7
13.6
80.4
69.8
44.7
11.9
69.9
62.6
15.7
11.8
10.7
14.9
40.48

Table 2.3 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-FGSM
and CW white-box attacks on the F-MNIST image classification benchmarks. The defense accuracies of Defense-GAN, MagNet, and Adversarial Training are imported from the
Defense-GAN paper Samangouei et al. (2018). Results on MNIST, CelebA and CIFAR-10
have the same pattern as above. Details can be found in section 2.5.
First, we test our algorithm on three types of white-box attacks: FGSM, RAND-FGSM
and CW attacks. The targeted CNN models are trained on the original training dataset for
10 epochs until convergence. Then for each clean training image we generate 12 different
adversarial images by using 3 different white-box attack algorithms, each with 4 different
configurations. For FGSM and RAND-FGSM, 4 different ϵ = 0.25, 0.3, 0.35 and 0.4 are used.
For the CW attack, 4 different learning rates lr = 6, 8, 10 and 12 are used. We combine these

adversarial images and the original clean images to form the input and output pairs to train
the Defense-VAE model. We initialize the weights of VAE with the normal distribution of
N(0, 0.02) for the convolutional layers and N(1, 0.02) for the batch normalization layers. We
note that usually 5 epochs are required for the Defense-VAE model to converge.
Additionally, we use the reconstructed images of Defense-VAE to retrain the CNN classifier to improve the classification accuracy. Although the original CNN classifiers have
already yielded very competitive performance compared with Defense-GAN, we note that
retraining CNN classifiers for Defense-VAE can further strengthen the defense accuracy notably. Interestingly, the authors of Defense-GAN reported that for Defense-GAN retraining
of CNN classifiers has negligible impact to the defense accuracy, while this is not true for
Defense-VAE.
As discussed in Sec. 2.2.2, we can also train the whole pipeline end to end by optimizing
the joint loss function 2.5 directly. This can be done through two approaches: (1) randomly
initialize the VAE and CNN classifier model parameters and train the whole pipeline from
scratch, and (2) pretrain VAE and CNN classifier separately and finetune the whole pipeline.
Our experiments show that both approaches are almost equally effective, with the finetuning yielding slightly better results. We therefore only report the finetuning results in the
following.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this end-to-end finetuning approach, we provide one
typical learning curve of the finetuning process in Figure 2.4, where the adversarial attacks
are generated by FGSM with ϵ = 0.3. Starting from separately pretrained VAE model and

CNN classifier (a.k.a., Defense-VAE-REC), we finetune the whole pipeline by optimizing the
joint loss function 2.5. As we can see, the end-to-end finetuning boosts the defense accuracy
by about 4% over the Defense-VAE model.

91.0
Defense accuracy

90.5
90.0
89.5
89.0
88.5
88.0
87.5

0

20

40
60
80
100
Number of finetuning epochs

120

Figure 2.4 The end-to-end finetuning can boost the defense accuracy even further, and yields
a stronger defense model.

Table 2.3 reports the defense accuracies of Defense-VAE on three different white-box
attacks: FGSM, RAND-FGSM and CW attacks. As a comparison, we also include the
results of Defense-GAN, MagNet and Adversarial Training under the same experimental
setups; for those results, we import them directly from the Defense-GAN paper Samangouei et al. (2018). As we can see, Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN are very competitive
to each other, and outperform all the other defense algorithms by significant margins on

all four benchmarks. Defense-VAE achieves superior performance over Defense-GAN, and
can recover almost all the accuracy losses due to the adversarial attacks. We also note
that retraining CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE-REC) and finetuning (Defense-VAE-E2E) can
further improve the defense accuracies beyond the original CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE)
by a notable margin, with the finetuning yielding the strongest defense against adversarial
attacks.

2.4.2 Robustness under Untrained Attacks
In principle we can train Defense-VAE on all known adversarial attacks to best counter
possible attacks in test. However, in reality new attacks are constantly invented; it’s almost
certain that after the deployment of Defense-VAE, some new adversarial attacks will emerge
and Defense-VAE has never been trained on those attacks. To investigate the robustness
of Defense-VAE in this circumstance, in this part of the experiments we train Defense-VAE
on two attacks and test its defense capability against the third untrained attack. Again,
three adversarial attacks are considered: FGSM, RAND-FGSM and CW, which gives three
possible combinations that are shown in Table 2.4. As we can see, Defense-VAE is very
robust for the first two attacks: FGSM and RAND-FGSM as the defense accuracies largely
remain the same as it’s trained on all three attacks. But for the CW attack, Defense-VAE
is less robust, manifested by the significant accuracy loss compared to the Defense-VAE
trained on all three attacks. Indeed, the CW attack is considered a much stronger attack
and could have a very distinct attack pattern to that of FGSM and RAND-FGSM. We
therefore incorporate Deepfool Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016a) to the training of Defense-

VAE to counter the untrained CW attack since DeepFool and CW have very similar attack
patterns. The results in parentheses show that this is indeed the case and Defense-VAE
again can recover the most accuracy losses under untrained CW attack.
Attack Classifier Trained on other 2 Trained on 3
A
87.34
89.03
B
73.38
74.41
FGSM
C
88.03
89.72
D
86.49
87.09
A
87.30
88.91
RAND
B
73.59
73.91
FGSM
C
88.19
89.38
D
86.73
87.18
A
43.48 (85.06)
86.99
B
34.52 (71.64)
73.69
CW
C
44.45 (85.22)
87.47
D
30.77 (84.69)
86.21
Table 2.4 Defense accuracy of Defense-VAE when it’s trained on two attacks but is used
to defend another attack. The results in parentheses are the accuracies after incorporating
DeepFool Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016a) as additional adversarial training examples for
Defense-VAE.
ϵ MNIST F-MNIST
0.10 98.95
86.04
0.15 98.67
86.32
86.39
0.20 98.58
0.25 98.44
86.51
86.36
0.30 98.29
Table 2.5 Defense accuracy of Defense-VAE with Model A under the FGSM attack with
various noise level ϵ when VAE is trained only on ϵ = 0.3.
Another interesting defense scenario is: what if Defense-VAE were tested on the same
type of attacks but with different attack configurations? To investigate this, we train DefenseVAE on the FGSM attack with ϵ = 0.3 and test its defense accuracies with different ϵ. We
validate this on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, with the results shown in Table 2.5. It shows
that that Defense-VAE is very robust to the untrained FGSM configurations as the defense
accuracies largely remain the same under the trained attacks, e.g., with ϵ = 0.3.

2.4.3 Results on Black-box Attacks

Classifier/
Substitute
A/B
A/E
B/B
B/E
C/B
C/E
D/B
D/E
Average

No
Attack
90.85
90.85
71.62
71.62
90.78
90.78
86.94
86.94
85.05

No
Defense
37.92
24.94
17.61
13.44
39.14
22.89
32.87
23.51
26.54

DefenseVAE
83.69
76.97
73.66
69.29
83.64
76.27
80.31
70.66
76.81

DefenseVAE-REC
86.64
83.02
72.42
69.36
86.88
80.16
85.80
79.48
80.47

DefenseVAE-E2E
86.39
83.61
75.22
71.78
87.67
80.32
84.78
77.53
80.91

DefenseGAN
58.60
47.90
49.40
37.20
52.89
48.71
57.79
40.07
49.07

MagNet
54.04
33.11
38.12
31.19
46.64
30.16
54.78
33.96
40.25

Adv. Tr.
ϵ = 0.3
73.93
69.45
31.77
26.17
77.91
75.04
61.72
50.93
58.37

Classifier/
Substitute
A/B
A/E
B/B
B/E
C/B
C/E
D/B
D/E
Average

No
Attack
99.15
99.15
96.10
96.10
99.08
99.08
97.87
97.87
98.05

No
Defense
65.89
76.32
14.40
26.48
60.74
72.73
33.36
39.95
48.73

DefenseVAE
98.68
98.64
95.89
96.26
97.91
98.30
97.68
97.72
97.63

DefenseVAE-REC
98.71
98.92
95.95
95.81
98.02
98.59
98.22
98.22
97.81

DefenseVAE-E2E
99.16
99.19
96.71
97.09
99.15
99.28
97.85
97.69
98.27

DefenseGAN
93.12
91.39
90.57
88.41
93.57
92.23
92.72
91.64
91.71

MagNet
69.37
67.10
56.87
46.27
75.71
67.60
68.17
60.73
63.98

Adv. Tr.
ϵ = 0.3
96.54
96.68
20.92
11.20
98.34
98.43
76.67
76.76
71.92

Table 2.6 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM black-box attacks on different image classification benchmarks: (top) F-MNIST, and (bottom) MNIST.
The defense accuracies of Defense-GAN, MagNet, and Adversarial Training are imported
from the Defense-GAN paper Samangouei et al. (2018).

Next, we test the defense capability of Defense-VAE under black-box attacks on the
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets. We train the targeted CNN model on the training
set for 10 epochs with the batch size of 100 and the learning rate of 10−3 until convergence.
Then the substitute model is trained with 150 images from the test set with the labels
predicted by the targeted CNN classifier.
In the black-box attacks, Defense-VAE, as a defender, has no prior knowledge of the
trained substitute model. Thus, we can only train Defense-VAE on the white-box attacks.

Therefore, the same Defense-VAE model trained from the experiments of white-box attacks
is used to defend the black-box attacks. 2 In this experiment, 4 targeted CNN classifiers: A,
B, C, and D, and 2 substitute models: B and E are considered, and this produces 8 possible
Classifier/Substitute combinations. Given a large number of experiments, in this part of
experiments, only the black-box FGSM attack is considered, with the results on MNIST
and Fashion-MNIST reported in Table 2.6. As a comparison, we also include the results of
Defense-GAN, MagNet and Adverarial Training under the same experimental setups; again,
for this set of results, we import them directly from the Defense-GAN paper Samangouei
et al. (2018). As we can see, on both datasets Defense-VAE outperforms Defense-GAN
and all other defense algorithms by significant margins. In particular, on Fashion-MNIST,
Defense-VAE improves the accuracy over Defense-GAN by about 30%. Also, as in the
white-box attack experiments, retrained CNN classifiers (Defense-VAE-REC) and finetuning
(Defense-VAE-E2E) can further boost the defense accuracies over the original CNN classifiers
(Defense-VAE) by a notable margin, with the end-to-end finetuning yielding the best defense
accuracies among all the methods.

2.5 Experiments on MNIST, CelebA and CIFAR-10

We perform the white-box and black-box attacks on MNIST Lecun et al. (1998), CelebA Liu
et al. (2015) and CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky (2009) datasets, with the results provided in Tables 2.8, 2.5 and 2.10, respectively. Again, we compare our method mainly with DefenseGAN Samangouei et al. (2018). Since Defense-GAN didn’t provide results on CIFAR-10, we
2

In other words, we just need to train one Defense-VAE to defend both white-box and black-box attacks.

run their code on CIFAR-10 and make sure the experimental settings for both algorithms
are the same. We didn’t provide the results related to the classifier model B due to its
unreasonable performance on CIFAR-10 probably due to the improper parameter configuration of model B for CIFAR-10, e.g., model B has much more parameters due to the large
convolutional kernel size (e.g., 8×8) and 3 input channels.
Similar to the results on F-MNIST provided in the main text, Defense-VAE outperforms
Defense-GAN consistently, and retraining CNN classifiers on the reconstructions of DefenseVAE boosts the accuracy significantly. We also notice that the defense accuracies on CIFAR10 are not as good as on CelebA. This is because CIFAR-10 is a much more challenging task
than CelebA: the former is a 10-way classification task, while the latter is only a binary
classification on human faces.
Classifier
Model
A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
D
RAND A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
α = 0.05 D
A
CW
B
l2 norm C
D
Average
Attack

No
Attack
99.15
96.10
99.08
97.87
99.15
96.10
99.08
97.87
99.15
96.10
99.08
97.87
98.05

No
Defense
14.65
1.81
29.53
4.33
8.65
1.65
5.99
3.25
8.45
3.00
5.53
3.92
7.56

Defense
VAE
98.29
95.92
98.41
97.56
98.40
95.83
98.33
97.81
92.69
87.66
94.46
83.42
94.90

Defense
VAE-REC
98.98
95.97
98.91
98.16
99.08
96.04
98.87
98.3
95.12
88.56
96.05
89.46
96.13

Defense
VAE-E2E
99.28
96.91
99.24
98.05
99.34
96.87
99.35
98.05
96.95
95.08
96.44
95.71
97.61

Defense
GAN
98.8
95.6
98.9
98.0
98.8
94.4
98.5
98.0
98.9
91.6
98.9
98.3
97.39

MagNet
19.1
8.2
16.3
9.4
17.1
9.1
15.1
11.5
3.8
3.4
2.5
2.1
9.80

Adv. Tr.
ϵ = 0.3
65.1
6.0
78.6
73.2
77.4
13.8
90.7
53.9
7.7
28.0
3.1
1.0
27.38

Table 2.7 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-FGSM
and CW white-box attacks on MNIST.

Classifier
Model
A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
D
RAND A
FGSM B
ϵ = 0.3 C
α = 0.05 D
A
CW
B
l2 norm C
D
Average
Attack

No
Attack
96.55
93.69
95.62
94.89
96.55
93.69
95.62
94.89
96.55
93.69
95.62
94.89
95.19

No
Defense
3.94
5.20
4.45
5.92
4.04
4.76
5.12
6.15
4.94
4.90
8.00
6.47
5.32

Defense
VAE
92.40
90.05
92.47
90.05
92.11
90.55
91.70
91.42
93.70
90.65
93.28
91.15
91.63

Defense
VAE-REC
94.89
92.45
94.46
93.66
94.56
92.57
93.76
93.53
95.07
92.40
94.57
93.12
93.75

Defense
VAE-E2E
95.10
92.85
95.25
93.91
95.34
93.07
94.15
93.87
95.90
93.55
95.92
93.39
94.36

Defense
GAN
92.55
91.40
92.55
92.05
92.80
90.30
92.00
91.65
82.10
74.65
79.85
77.40
87.44

MagNet
9.85
9.20
10.85
9.75
11.05
10.15
10.45
11.05
9.85
9.55
9.85
10.40
10.17

Adv. Tr.
ϵ = 0.3
12.25
23.45
11.30
77.55
7.00
45.15
10.55
6.96
56.90
7.25
26.35
50.10
27.90

Table 2.8 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-FGSM
and CW white-box attacks on CelebA.

Classifier
Model
A
FGSM C
ϵ = 0.3 D
RAND A
FGSM C
ϵ = 0.3 D
A
CW
C
l2 norm D
Average
Attack

No
Attack
86.52
87.62
61.76
86.52
87.62
61.76
86.52
87.62
61.76
78.63

No
Defense
2.44
5.05
8.24
3.71
3.87
7.94
2.34
7.13
7.78
5.39

Defense
VAE
44.86
43.92
47.75
39.84
41.28
47.88
38.41
41.21
53.32
44.27

Defense
VAE-REC
48.52
47.29
50.69
47.80
46.16
50.67
45.91
46.26
55.81
48.79

Defense
VAE-E2E
50.72
47.39
53.36
50.51
47.91
51.18
49.44
46.19
57.21
50.43

Defense
GAN
51.92
47.84
33.80
50.36
48.52
26.78
45.62
43.87
20.35
41.01

Table 2.9 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM, RAND-FGSM
and CW white-box attacks on CIFAR-10. Since the Defense-GAN paper didn’t provide the
white-box attack results on CIFAR-10, we run their original code and provide the results in
the table.
2.5.1 Why is Defense-VAE so effective?
The results above demonstrated superior performance of Defense-VAE over Defense-GAN.
For the black-box FGSM attack, the former even outperforms the latter by about 30%. To
understand why Defense-VAE can have such a large leap, we investigate the reconstructed
images by Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN in this experimental setup, i.e., the black-box

FGSM attack on Fashion-MNIST. Figure 2.5 shows some typical examples from this experiment. As can be seen, the reconstructed images from Defense-VAE often preserve the correct
class information of their underlying clean images, while Defense-GAN has a harder time to
identify a correct reconstruction even though it searches for the right z from R random initializations and optimizes in L back-propagations, with typical R = 10 and L = 200. As we
discussed in Sec. 2.3, Defense-VAE identifies a proper z directly by forward-propagating the
input adversarial image through the VAE-encoder, and reconstructs a high quality denoised
image through the VAE-decoder, and no online iterative optimization is involved.

Original Image

Adversarial Image

Reconstrution by GAN Reconstrution by VAE

Figure 2.5 The example reconstructions by Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN from the blackbox FGSM attacks on Fashion-MNIST: (first column) original images; (second column)
adversarial images; (third column) reconstruction by Defense-GAN; (fourth column) reconstruction by Defense-VAE.

Classifier/
Substitute
C/E
D/E
Average

No
Attack
87.62
61.76
74.69

No
Defense
14.13
10.39
12.16

DefenseVAE
37.22
32.60
34.91

DefenseVAE-REC
42.68
38.10
40.39

DefenseVAE-E2E
45.72
37.18
41.45

DefenseGAN
20.24
11.68
16.32

Table 2.10 Classification accuracies of different defense methods under FGSM black-box
attacks on CIFAR-10. Since the Defense-GAN paper didn’t provide the black-box attack
results on CIFAR-10, we run their original code and provide the results in the table.
2.5.2 Defense Speed
Besides the superior defense accuracy of Defense-VAE, another advantage of Defense-VAE
is its superior defense speed over Defense-GAN. As discussed above, to identify a high quality reconstruction, Defense-VAE doesn’t need expensive online iterative optimizations, while
Defense-GAN requires L iterative back-propagations with R random restarts. To have a
quantitative speed comparison between Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN, we calculate their
reconstruction times on 1000 adversarial images from Fashion-MNIST, with the results reported in Table 2.11, where different R and L configurations are considered.
As we can see, compared to the default Defense-GAN configuration, i.e., L = 200 and
R = 10, Defense-VAE is about 50x faster than Defense-GAN. Moreover, as L and R increase,
Defense-GAN generally has a slightly better defense accuracy, but the run time also increases
linearly as O(L × R). The constant run-time complexity of Defense-VAE makes it widely
deployable in real-time security-sensitive systems.

2.5.3 Adversarial Detection
The reconstruction property of Defense-VAE also entails a simple detection mechanism for
the model to detect if an input image contains adversarial perturbations or not. Such a

Run Time on
Defense Method
1000 Images (s)
Defense-VAE
9.03
L∗ = 200, R∗ = 10
441.81
875.48
Defense-GAN L = 400, R = 10
L = 200, R = 20
876.10
L = 400, R = 20
1720.13
Table 2.11 Run-time comparison between Defense-VAE and Defense-GAN, where
Defense-GAN recommended configuration.

∗

denotes

functionality allows a flexibility of integrating Defense-VAE with other defense algorithms
to form a defense pipeline, where Defense-VAE can be a component for adversarial detection
or adversarial defense or both.
Since Defense-VAE is trained on the pair of (x̂, x), where x̂ = x + δ. If the input x̂
contains adversarial perturbations δ, the reconstructed output will be close to a clean image
x. Therefore, the MSE between input and output of Defense-VAE will be relatively large.
On the other hand, if the input x̂ contains no adversarial perturbations, then the MSE
will be very small and potentially close to zero. Thus, we can use the MSE as a signal to
determine if an input image contains adversarial perturbations or not by simply thresholding
the MSE.
To verify this idea, we generate a set of white-box FGSM attacks on Fashion-MNIST
with different ϵ. We then use the Defense-VAE model trained from the white-box attack
experiment for adversarial detection. For each FGSM attack with a different ϵ, we compute
the MSE between the input and output images of Defense-VAE. By sweeping the threshold
on the MSE values, we can produce a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for
each ϵ. The ROC curves for 5 different ϵ are reported in Figure 2.6. To measure the detection

performance, the Area Under Curve (AUC) for each ϵ is also included. As we can see, for
large magnitude FGSM attack, e.g., ϵ = 0.3 or 0.25, the AUC is almost 100%. When
the attack magnitude ϵ becomes smaller, the adversarial images become harder to detect.
However, Defense-VAE still achieves 97% AUC when ϵ = 0.15 and an AUC of 87% when
ϵ = 0.1.
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Figure 2.6 The ROC curves when using Defense-VAE to detect the adversarial attacks generated by FGSM with different ϵ.

2.6 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose Defense-VAE, a fast and accurate defense algorithm against adversarial attacks. The algorithm is generic and can defense both white-box and black-box
attacks without the need of retraining the original CNN classifier, and can further boost the

defense strength by retraining or end-to-end finetuning. Compared with the state-of-theart algorithms, in particular, Defense-GAN, our algorithm outperforms them in almost all
white-box and black-box defense benchmarks. In addition, Defense-VAE is very efficient as
compared to the optimization-based defense alternatives, such as Defense-GAN, as no expensive iterative online optimization is needed. Speed test shows that Defense-VAE is about
50x faster than Defense-VAE. Given the superior defense accuracy and speed, we believe
Defense-VAE is widely deployable in real-time security-sensitive systems.
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CHAPTER 3
Generative Dynamic Patch Attack

3.1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated remarkable success in solving complex
prediction tasks in a variety of fields: computer vision Deng et al. (2009), natural language
processing Sutskever et al. (2014) and speech recognition Senior et al. (2012). However,
recent studies show that they are particularly vulnerable to adversarial examples Goodfellow
et al. (2015) in the form of small perturbations to inputs that lead DNNs to predict incorrect
outputs.
Recent works Brown et al. (2017); Karmon et al. (2018); Evtimov et al. (2017); Sharif
et al. (2016); Yang et al. (2020, 2019), show that perturbing part of an image with perceivable noise is another effective method to attack neural network models. Typically, attackers
can craft perceivable patches to replace part of images for adversarial attack. The advantage
of this perceivable patch attack is that it is more practical than the imperceptible adversarial attacks in the real world: adversaries can paste a sticker on a traffic sign to attack the
autopilot system of autonomous vehicles. There are several situations where patch attack is
significant concerning due to its security threats: 1) an attacker uses adversarially designed
eyeglass frames Sharif et al. (2016) to fool face recognition (Fig. 3.1a), 2) an attacker pastes
adversarially crafted stickers Evtimov et al. (2017) on stop signs to fool traffic sign classification (Fig. 3.1b), and 3) a universal adversarial patch Brown et al. (2017) causes targeted
misclassification of any object (Fig. 3.1c).

Figure 3.1 Different types of patch attacks: (a) Eyeglasses Attack Sharif et al. (2016), (b)
Sticker Attack Evtimov et al. (2017), (c) Adversarial Patch Brown et al. (2017), and (d)
GDPA (ours).
However, it is a significant limitation that most patch attack algorithms do not consider
the problem of finding the best location in an image to inject the patch. Existing patch attack
algorithms either use a fixed position as patch location Sharif et al. (2016); Evtimov et al.
(2017); Yang et al. (2019) or learn patches that are universal across different locations Brown
et al. (2017); Karmon et al. (2018); Yang et al. (2020). The fixed location methods show high
attack success rates but are poorly performed at other locations, while the random location
patches do not have competitive attack success rates compared to the fixed location methods.
To address this issue, in this paper we propose a Generative Dynamic Patch Attack (GDPA),
which learns image-dependent patch pattern and patch location altogether. GDPA is inspired
by the idea that different images have different sets of weak pixels since DNN classifiers
typically focus on different image regions when queried by different images Simonyan et al.
(2013). Therefore, an image-dependent dynamic patch attack would be more effective than
a fixed location or random location patch attack.
On the other hand, due to the security threats of adversarial attacks, a variety of adversarial defense algorithms have been developed recently Goodfellow et al. (2015); Lyu et al.

(2015b); Shaham et al. (2018), among which adversarial training (AT) Goodfellow et al.
(2015) has been proved the most effective one for hardening neural networks against adversarial attacks. Although AT with the PGD attack Madry et al. (2018) is the most scalable
and effective method for learning robust models, a recent work of Wu et al. Wu et al. (2019)
shows that AT exhibits limited effectiveness against three high-profile physically realizable
patch attacks: eyeglasses attack Sharif et al. (2016), sticker attack Evtimov et al. (2017)
and adversarial patch Brown et al. (2017). To overcome this limitation, Wu et al. Wu et al.
(2019) propose a Rectangular Occlusion Attack (ROA) for adversarial training, which yields
models highly robust to patch attacks. ROA is a two-stage patch attack algorithm, which
first uses a gray pattern to find the location in image that maximizes the cross-entropy loss
via grid search, and then optimizes the patch pattern at the identified position. However,
this two-stage patch attack method is suboptimal and has quite a few limitations (see a
discussion in Sec. 3.2), which motivates us to propose GDPA that learns patch pattern and
patch location simultaneously. Moreover, to improve the inference efficiency, GDPA employs
a generator to generate patch pattern and location with one forward propagation, without
expensive iterative optimizations that are usually employed by other attack algorithms, such
as PGD Madry et al. (2018) and ROA Wu et al. (2019). Concretely, we make the following
contributions:
• We introduce a generic patch attack method GDPA that can generate dynamic/static
and visible/invisible patch attacks with a few configuration changes.
• GDPA employs a generator to generate patch pattern and patch location altogether

per image, and reduces the inference time substantially (e.g., 40-50x faster).
• GDPA is end-to-end differentiable and can be readily integrated for adversarial training
to defend high-profile patch attacks.
• Experiments show that GDPA has superior attack success rates over strong patch
attack baselines, and the adversarially trained model with GDPA is more robust to
various adversarial attacks than state-of-the-art methods.

3.2 Related Works

Adversarial Attack
Most adversarial attack methods focus on adding imperceptible perturbation covering the
entire image Goodfellow et al. (2015); Szegedy et al. (2013). Recently, researchers have
shown that perturbing a part of image with perceptible noise is another practical method
to attack DNN models Brown et al. (2017); Karmon et al. (2018); Wu et al. (2019); Sharif
et al. (2016); Evtimov et al. (2017); Yang et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2020); Yang et al. (2019).
Sharif et al. Sharif et al. (2016) propose to add eyeglasses with a specially constructed frame
texture to attack face recognition. Eykholt et al. Evtimov et al. (2017) show that adding
specific rectangular solid-colored patches on traffic signs can fool traffic sign classification.
LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) learns visible and localized patches that are transferable across
images and locations by training the pattern at a random location with a randomly picked
image in each iteration. Recently, Wu et al. Wu et al. (2019) propose a Rectangle Occlusion Attack (ROA) to generate adversarial patches for adversarial training. ROA uses an

exhaustive search (ROA-Exh) or a gradient guided search (ROA-Grad) to find the location
that maximizes the cross-entropy (CE) loss and optimizes the patch pattern afterwards.
Specifically, ROA-Exh exhaustively searches on images with a stride, and ROA-Grad uses
the magnitude of gradient of the CE loss as the sensitivity of regions to identify the top
candidate regions to accelerate the location search. However, ROA has some considerable
limitations. Firstly, it employs a two-stage attack generation, which separates the process of
finding the patch location and patch pattern into two steps: it first finds the position using
a gray pattern and then optimizes the patch pattern at that position. Hence, the location
identified by a gray pattern may not be the best patch location for the optimized pattern.
Secondly, the two-stage optimization of ROA is computationally expensive and slows down
the patch generation process during inference. Different from these algorithms, our GDPA
trains a generator to generate the patch pattern and location altogether for each input image. Moreover, GDPA is end to end differentiable, which entails an efficient optimization
and easy integration for adversarial training.
Before GDPA, several works Poursaeed et al. (2018); Baluja & Fischer (2017); Reddy Mopuri et al. (2018); Xiao et al. (2018) have proposed to train generators to generate perturbation to improve the fooling rate and inference speed. Poursaeed et al. Poursaeed et al.
(2018) present a trainable network to transform input images to adversarial perturbations.
Baluja and Fischer Baluja & Fischer (2017) train feed-forward neural networks in a selfsupervised manner to generate adversarial examples against a target network. Different to
these generator-based attack methods, our GDPA generates both patch pattern and patch

location altogether, and employ an affine transform to synthesize adversarial patch examples.

Adversarial Defense
Defending against adversarial attacks is a challenging task. Different types of defense algorithms have been proposed in the past few years Dziugaite et al. (2016); Guo et al. (2017a);
Luo et al. (2015b); Gao et al. (2017); Gu & Rigazio (2014b); Lyu et al. (2015b); Akhtar
et al. (2018); Guo et al. (2017a); Xu et al. (2018); Wu et al. (2019); Naseer et al. (2019);
Chiang et al. (2020); Hayes (2018), among which adversarial training (AT) Madry et al.
(2018) has been proved the most effective one against adversarial attacks. AT employs adversarial examples as data augmentation to train a robust model. It has been shown that
this method can improve the defense accuracy effectively and sometimes can even improve
the accuracy upon the model trained only on the original clean dataset Wang et al. (2020).
However, a recent work of Wu et al. Wu et al. (2019) shows that robust models trained
by AT exhibit limited effectiveness against high-profile patch attacks Sharif et al. (2016);
Evtimov et al. (2017); Brown et al. (2017). As the first work attempting to defend patch
attacks, Wu et al. Wu et al. (2019) propose DOA, which performs a standard adversarial
training with Rectangle Occlusion Attack (ROA). As we discussed earlier in this section,
ROA has some considerable limitations, which limit its performance on adversarial defense.
Our GDPA does not suffer from those limitations of ROA, and is end-to-end differentiable
and more amenable for adversarial training.
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Figure 3.2 The GDPA generation pipeline. Given an image x, GDPA generates a patch
pattern and a patch location for weighted adversarial patch injection. α ∈ [0, 1] controls the
visibility of the patch attack. The pipeline is fully differentiable.
3.3 The GDPA Framework

GDPA is a framework that aims to conduct dynamic patch attack by generating adversarial
patch pattern and patch location altogether for each input image. It has a generic formulation that can generate dynamic/static and visible/invisible patch attacks. As an overview,
Figure 3.2 illustrates the GDPA generation pipeline, while Figure 3.3 demonstrates how
GDPA can be utilized to train an adversarially robust model.

3.3.1 Problem Formulation
We start with the definition of dynamic patch attack. Let D = {X, Y} denote a training
dataset, where X is a set of images of size w × h, and Y are their corresponding labels. Let
T : X → Y denote a target model that we attempt to attack. Given an image x ∈ X and
a target model T , our dynamic patch attack aims to find a pattern of size w′ × h′ and a
position in image that once placed on image x it can mislead the target model.

3.3.2 Localized Pattern Generation
One crucial component of GDPA is the generator that generates patch pattern and patch
location for a given image. Since patch pattern and patch location are coupled to a given
image, we design a generator G with two heads that share the same latent features extracted
by an encoder. Specifically, our generator includes an encoder GE to extract the feature
representation of image x, followed by a location decoder GL and a pattern decoder GP to
generate location and pattern of the adversarial patch:

lx , ly = tanh (GL (GE (x))/β),

(3.1)

pattern = 0.5 × tanh(GP (GE (x))) + 0.5,

(3.2)

where lx and ly are the location (2D coordinates) of a patch in image x with the origin at
the center of image, and pattern is the patch pattern of size w′ × h′ . To keep the patch
location lx and ly within the boundary of image, we use a tanh function to constrain lx and
ly in the range of [−1, 1], where β is a hyperparameter that controls the slope of tanh. All
experiments in this paper use β = 3000, which we found to work well across a variety of
architectures and datasets. Similarly, we use another tanh to impose the pattern values in
the range of [0, 1]1 .
Specially, we use a convolutional neural network as our encoder network GE , with an
architecture adapted from the work of image-to-image translation Zhu et al. (2017). On top
of GE , we use two fully-connected networks as our decoders GP and GL , respectively. Due
1

As a preprocessing step, all images are normalized to have pixel values in the range of [0, 1].

to page limit, details of the network architectures are provided in the Appendix.

3.3.3 Weighted Adversarial Patch Injection
With the generated patch location and patch pattern, we then define a function to inject the
patch into image x. Standard adversarial attacks Madry et al. (2018) employ an additive
function to inject noise: x′ = x + p, where p is an imperceptible adversarial perturbation.
Recently, other forms of perturbations, such as multiplicative ones x′ = x ⊙ m Yang &
Ji (2020), have been explored to inject perturbations. In addition, LAVAN Karmon et al.
′

′

(2018) employs (1 − m) ⊙ x + m ⊙ p with a binary mask m ∈ {0, 1}w ×h to generate patch
attack adversarial examples. Inspired by LAVAN, we extend this function by relaxing the
′

′

binary mask to a continuous mask m ∈ [0, 1]w ×h for adversarial patch injection. Specifically,
we employ the following weighted adversarial patch injection

xadv = (1 − m) ⊙ x + m ⊙ p,
′

(3.3)

′

with m ∈ [0, 1]w ×h

which is a convex combination of original image x and patch pattern p with the weight
defined by m. We find this relaxed version is more flexible and easier to optimize than the
one LAVAN explored. Next, we discuss how to use the generated (lx , ly ) and pattern to
inject an adversarial patch to image x.

3.3.4 Differentiable Affine Transformation
We employ an affine transformation in GDPA to inject adversarial patches into images. To
make the whole pipeline differentiable w.r.t. lx and ly , a bilinear interpolation is used to
estimate the pixel values that are not on the pixel grids after transformation. By doing this,
the whole pipeline is fully differentiable and the gradient can be back-propagated end-to-end
to update parameters of generator G. Specifically, we adopt the affine transformation and
image sampling method of Spatial Transformer Networks Jaderberg et al. (2015) to define a
differentiable translate operator, which can translate a source image to a target image by a
displacement of (lx , ly ).
We first use an affine transform to compute the pixel index relationship between source
image and target image:
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(3.4)

where (xti , yit ) is the pixel index of target image, and (xsi , yis ) is the corresponding pixel index
in source image. We set θ11 = 1, θ21 = 0, θ12 = 0, θ22 = 1, θ13 = w′ /2 · lx and θ23 = h′ /2 · ly
for translation purpose2 . Thus, we have xsi = xti + w′ /2 · lx and yis = yit + h′ /2 · ly , where
2

Note that we can also learn θ11 , θ12 , θ21 , θ22 to rotate, dilate or shear an adversarial patch to further
improve GDPA’s performance. For simplicity and also because we can already achieve state-of-the-art attack
success rate (ASR) with translation, in this paper we only consider translation and will leave advanced affine
transform to future work.

lx , ly ∈ [−1, 1]. Since (xsi , yis ) are continuous variables, we can use a bilinear interpolation to
sample the pixel values from source image:

w−1 X
h−1
X
vi =
ujk max(0,1−|xsi−j|) max(0,1−|yis−k|),

(3.5)

j=0 k=0

where ujk is the pixel value at index (j, k) of the source image, and vi is the output value
of pixel i at index (xti , yit ) of the translated image. With the affine transform and bilinear
sampler described above, we have a differentiable translate operator, which we denote as
T ranslate() in the rest part of the paper.
Maximize
Minimize
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GDPA Patch
Injection
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T
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Figure 3.3 The GDPA-AT pipeline. Given an image, GDPA generates an adversarial patch to
maximize the loss of classifier T , while classifier T learns from the patch attack to minimize
its loss.

3.3.5 Generative Dynamic Patch Attack
Figure 3.2 illustrates the GDPA generation pipeline, which includes the three components
we described above: patch pattern and location generator, differentiable affine transform,
and the weighted adversarial patch injection to produce an image-dependent dynamic patch
attack.

As shown in Figure 3.2, we introduce an initial mask mcenter of the same size of input
image, and the center part of the mask has value 1 and rest of 0. Then we use the affine
transform T ranslate() to translate mcenter by a displacement of (lx , ly ):

m = α · T ranslate(mcenter , lx , ly ),

(3.6)

where α ∈ [0, 1] is a hyperparameter that controls the visibility of adversarial patches. When
α = 1, the patch would be completely visible and replace the original image pixel values;
otherwise, the visibility of the adversarial patch will be lower. In practice, we can use a small
value of α to generate human imperceptible adversarial patches.
Similarly, we can generate a translated patch pattern. As shown in Figure 3.2, once
pattern is generated, we zero pad it to create a pattern pcenter of the same size of input image
with pattern at the center. We then translate pcenter by (lx , ly ) via the affine transform:

p = T ranslate(pcenter , lx , ly ).

(3.7)

Finally, we can generate a GDPA adversarial example for image x by

xadv = (1 − m) ⊙ x + m ⊙ p.

(3.8)

As we can see, all the components in Figure 3.2 are differentiable. Therefore, the whole
GPDA generation pipeline is fully differentiable and can be optimized efficiently with gradient-

based methods.
To train the generator for non-targeted patch attack, we can optimize G to maximize the
cross-entropy loss of target model T with class labels

arg min −LCE (T, xadv , y).

(3.9)

G

We can also launch a targeted patch attack to fool the target model T to misclassify an
input x as target class ytarget by

arg min LCE (T, xadv , ytarget )
G

Details of the GDPA training algorithm are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: GDPA generator training
Input: training set D; target model T ; visibility α
Output: generator G
initialize generator G;
for number of training epochs do
for each (x, y) ∈ D do
lx , ly = GL ((GE (x));
pattern = GP (GE (x));
m = α · T ranslate(mcenter , lx , ly );
p = T ranslate(pcenter , lx , ly );
xadv = (1 − m) ⊙ x + m ⊙ p;
if targeted attack then
loss = LCE (T, xadv , ytarget );
else
loss = −LCE (T, xadv , y);
end
θG = θG − lr ∗ ∂loss/∂θG
end
end

(3.10)

3.3.6 Adversarial Training with GDPA
Adversarial training with the PGD attack exhibits limited effectiveness against high-profile
patch attacks Wu et al. (2019). In this section, we discuss how to utilize GDPA for adversarial
training to improve model robustness against high-profile patch attacks.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the GDPA adversarial training (GDPA-AT) pipeline to train a
robust model against patch attacks. Similar to Generative Adversarial Networks Goodfellow
et al. (2014a), GDPA-AT trains generator G and target classifier T iteratively to optimize
the following minimax objective:

min max E(x,y)∼D [LCE (T, xadv , y)],
T

G

(3.11)

where the inner maximization step optimizes generator G to maximize the classification loss
of T , while the outer minimization step optimizes target classifier T to minimize the classification loss. Unlike the traditional adversarial training, in which the inner maximization step
usually optimizes an adversarial example xadv directly, our GDPA-AT optimizes a generator
G to generate patch attack with one forward propagation. As the iterative training proceeds,
the generator G searches for the weakest image region to attack classifier T at each iteration,
while T learns from the current patch attacks and becomes more resilient to these attacks
over time. Details of our GDPA-AT algorithm are described in Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2: GDPA-AT
Input: training set D
Output: target classifier T ; generator G
initialize classifier T and generator G;
for number of training epochs do
for each (x, y) ∈ D do
xadv = GDP A(G, x) ;
loss = −LCE (T, xadv , y) ;
θG = θG − lrG ∗ ∂loss/∂θG ;
xadv = GDP A(G, x) ;
loss = LCE (T, xadv , y) ;
θT = θT − lrT ∗ ∂loss/∂θT
end
end

3.4 Experimental Results

We now validate GDPA on benchmark datasets for adversarial patch attack and adversarial
defense. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of GDPA on patch attack in Section 3.4.1
and GDPA-AT on improving model robustness in Section 3.4.2. To evaluate the inference
efficiency, we also compare the run-times of GPDA and state-of-the-art attack algorithms in
Section 3.4.8. All our experiments are performed with PyTorch on Nvidia RTX GPUs. Our
source code is provided as a part of supplementary materials.

Experimental Setup
We evaluate GDPA and GDPA-AT on three benchmark datasets: VGGFace Sharif et al.
(2016), Traffic Sign Evtimov et al. (2017) and ImageNet Deng et al. (2009). To evaluate
GDPA’s attack performance, we compare GDPA with LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) and
ROA Wu et al. (2019), two state-of-the-art patch attack algorithms that generate patches

based on iterative optimizations. Following their experimental settings, we run LAVAN
and ROA for 50 optimization iterations with a learning rate of 4. For adversarial defense
experiments, we compare GDPA-AT with DOA Wu et al. (2019) and PGD-AT Madry et al.
(2018). The former is a state-of-the-art defense algorithm for patch attacks, while the latter
is a well-established defense algorithm for adversarial attacks. We evaluate the robustness of
the models under eyeglasses attack Sharif et al. (2016), sticker attack Evtimov et al. (2017)
and standard PGD attack Madry et al. (2018). Following the settings in DOA Wu et al.
(2019), we use 70 × 70 patches with stride 5 for VGGFace and 7 × 7 patches with stride
2 for Traffic Sign to generate ROA attacks. We set ϵ = 16 for PGD-AT since this yields
the best results of PGD-AT. We use attack success rate (ASR) Dong et al. (2020) as the
metric to evaluate the effectiveness of an attack, and use classification accuracy to evaluate
the robustness of a model when under adversarial attacks. Details of benchmark datasets,
high-profile patch attacks, network architectures and training procedures can be found in
the Appendix.

3.4.0.1 Experimental Details
We first describe the three benchmark datasets and target models used in our experiments.
These datasets are used to train our GDPA generator, robust models with adversarial training, and evaluate the performance of patch attacks.

3.4.0.2 VGGFace
Dataset
The VGGFace dataset Parkhi et al. (2015) is a benchmark for face recognition, containing
2,622 subjects and 2.6 million images in total. Same with DOA Wu et al. (2019), we choose
10 subjects and sample face images only containing those individuals. We process the data
to the size of 224 × 224 by standard crop-and-resize, and perform class-balanced split to
generate training, validation, and test datasets with ratio 7:2:1. As a result, we obtain 3178,
922 and 470 images for training, validation and test, respectively. The training set is used
to train the target model, the GDPA generator and robust models with adversarial training.
Likewise, the test set is used to evaluate the target model, the performance of patch attack
and adversarial defense.

Target Model
We use the VGGFace CNN model Parkhi et al. (2015) as the target classifier in our experiments. We use standard transfer learning on our processed dataset, keeping the convolutional
layers in the VGGFace CNN model, but adjusting the number of output neurons of the last
fully connected layer to 10. In order to use the pre-trained weights from the convolutional
layers of VGGFace CNN model, we convert the images from RGB to BGR and subtract the
mean value [129.2, 104.8, 93.6]. We set the batch size to 64 and use the Adam Optimizer
with an initial learning rate of 10−4 . We drop the learning rate by 0.1 every 10 epochs.
For hyperparameter tuning and model selection, we track the accuracy on validation set to

avoid overfitting. We train the model on training set for 30 epochs and obtain an accuracy
of 98.94% on test data.

3.4.0.3 Traffic Sign
Dataset
To have a fair comparison with DOA Wu et al. (2019), we pick the same 16 traffic signs from
the dataset LISA Mogelmose et al. (2012) with 3,509 training and 1,148 validation images.
Following the prior works Evtimov et al. (2017); Wu et al. (2019), we further sample 40
stop signs from the validation set as the test data to evaluate performance of the stop sign
classification. Similarly, all the data are processed by standard crop-and-resize to 32 × 32
pixels. Same with VGGFace, we use the training set to train the target model, the GDPA
generator and robust models with adversarial training. We use the test set to evaluate the
performance of the target model, patch attack and adversarial defense.

Target Model
We use the LISA-CNN Evtimov et al. (2017) as the target model, which contains three
convolutional layers and one fully-connected layer. We use the Adam Optimizer with initial
learning rate 0.1 and drop the learning rate by 0.1 every 10 epochs. We set the batch size
to 128. After 30 epochs, we achieve an accuracy of 98.69% on the validation set, and 100%
accuracy on the test data.

3.4.0.4 ImageNet
Dataset
ImageNet Deng et al. (2009) is a well-known large scale object recognition benchmark. To
develop the training and validation sets to train and evaluate the GDPA generator and robust
models with adversarial training, we follow Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
(2017) to select a subset of 10, 000 images from ImageNet training set (randomly choose ten
images for each class) as our training set, and use the whole ImageNet validation set (50, 000
images) as our validation set.

Target Model
Following Poursaeed at el. Poursaeed et al. (2018), we use a pre-trained VGG19 model Simonyan & Zisserman (2014) from PyTorch library as the target model. This model achieves
an accuracy of 72.4% on the validation set.

3.4.0.5 Patch Attacks
Eyeglasses Attack
This is an effective physically realizable patch attack developed by Sharif et al. Sharif et al.
(2016). It first initializes the eyeglass frames with 5 different colors, and chooses the color
with the highest cross-entropy loss as starting color. For each update step, it divides the
gradient value by its maximum and multiplies the results with the learning rate. Then it
only keeps the gradient value in the eyeglass frame area. Finally, it clips and rounds the

pixel values to keep them in the valid range. We evaluate the eyeglasses attack on the test
set of VGGFace.

Sticker Attack
Proposed by Evtimov et al. Evtimov et al. (2017), this is another physically realizable patch
attack. It initializes the stickers on the stop signs with random noise at fixed locations.
For each update step, it uses the Adam optimizer with the learning rate 0.1 (and default
parameters) to maximize the classification loss of the target model. Just as the other patch
attacks, adversarial perturbations are restricted to the mask area; in our experiments, we
use the same collection of small rectangles as in Evtimov et al. (2017). We evaluate the
sticker attack on the test set of Traffic Sign.

3.4.0.6 GDPA Network Architecture and Training Details
Network Architecture
For VGGFace and ImageNet, both having images of size 224 × 224, we adopt the encoder
network structure GE from the work of image-to-image translation Zhu et al. (2017). For the
Traffic Sign dataset, which has images of size 32 × 32, we adopt a CNN of 3 convolutional
layers with kernel size 4 and stride 2 as the encoder network GE . We then use a neural
network of one fully-connected layer with output size 3 × w′ × h′ as the pattern decoder GP ,
and a neural network of one fully-connected layer with output size 2 as the location decoder
GL .

GDPA Training Details
Following Algorithm 1 in the main text, we train the GDPA generator G by using the
Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.1 for VGGFace and ImageNet, and 0.01
for Traffic Sign. We drop the learning rate by 0.2 every 10 epochs and train the generator
for 30 epochs. We set the batch size to 32 and β to 3000, which we find works well across
various architectures and datasets in our experiments.

GDPA-AT Training Details
Following Algorithm 2 in the main text, we train the GDPA generator G and target model
T iteratively. We initialize the generator with a pre-trained GDPA generator and the target
model with a cross-entropy trained model. We set the w′ and h′ to 70 for VGGFace and
7 for Traffic Sign during the adversarial training. We use the Adam optimizer to train the
generator and the target model, with a learning rate of 0.0001 for both VGGFace and Traffic
Sign, and drop the learning rate by 0.2 every 50 epochs. We use batch size 32 and train for
1000 epochs for VGGFace and 5000 epochs for Traffic Sign.

3.4.1 Dynamic Patch Attack
We first evaluate the performance of GDPA on non-targeted and targeted patch attacks and
compare it with the state-of-the-arts: LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) and ROA Wu et al.
(2019). We provide results of two versions of ROA: ROA-Exh and ROA-Grad, where the
former exhaustively searches for a patch location in images with a fixed stride, and the
latter uses the magnitude of gradient as the sensitivity of regions to identify top regions to

Percentage of Attacked Pixels
Non-Targeted Attack
Targeted Attack
1% 2% 5% 10% 1% 2% 5% 10%
LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) 33.4 58.7 85.1 93.9 32.2 48.1 80.9 89.9
Traffic Sign ROA-Grad Wu et al. (2019) 36.2 61.8 87.3 93.6 29.8 44.6 74.5 90.5
ROA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
37.1 63.0 89.4 93.8 31.3 45.9 76.2 91.7
GDPA
39.6 64.1 91.3 94.3 33.9 50.4 77.5 92.8
LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) 31.9 42.7 56.3 92.0 37.8 57.9 67.2 94.6
VGGFace ROA-Grad Wu et al. (2019) 37.5 62.3 84.2 99.6 46.3 75.6 89.0 99.2
ROA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
38.3 64.5 86.0 99.6 48.2 76.7 91.1 99.3
GDPA
46.3 76.4 88.4 99.5 50.5 83.4 95.5 99.8
LAVAN Karmon et al. (2018) 89.2 92.8 97.8 99.9 86.3 93.8 99.7 99.8
ImageNet ROA-Grad Wu et al. (2019) 93.5 94.6 98.7 99.7 79.6 88.3 97.5 99.8
ROA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
94.8 95.3 99.2 99.7 81.1 89.6 98.4 99.8
GDPA
96.3 96.9 99.7 99.8 89.3 94.4 99.6 99.9
Dataset

Algorithm

Table 3.1 The ASRs of different patch attack algorithms on datasets Traffic Sign, VGGFace
and ImageNet. Both non-targeted attack and targeted attack are considered. The performances are evaluated with patches of different sizes.
accelerate the location search. We evaluate the effectiveness of the attack algorithms when
perturbing different percentages of pixels. To interpret the results, we also visualize the
perturbed images generated by GDPA.

Non-targeted Patch Attack
Table 3.1 (left part) reports the ASRs of GDPA and the other competing algorithms for
non-targeted patch attacks. The ASRs of an attack algorithm are evaluated on a model
trained with cross-entropy (CE) loss when attacked with patches of different sizes (1%, 2%,
5% or 10% of pixels). Specifically, We use square patches of width 3, 5, 7, 10 for Traffic Sign
and 23, 32, 50, 71 for VGGFace and ImageNet. As expected, the larger patch size is, the
higher ASR is achieved for all patch attack algorithms. In most of the cases, GDPA achieves
higher ASRs than the competing algorithms.
Figure 3.4 visualizes the perturbed images of different patch sizes generated by GDPA for

Figure 3.4 Non-targeted Attack: Perturbed images of VGGFace and ImageNet generated by
GDPA with different patch sizes. The last column of targeted attack are example images of
target classes.

Figure 3.5 Targeted Attack:Perturbed images of VGGFace and ImageNet generated by
GDPA with different patch sizes. The last column of targeted attack are example images of
target classes.
non-targeted attack on VGGFace and ImageNet. As we can see, the patches generated on
VGGFace (top row) demonstrates clear semantic meanings, resembling human eyes, nose or
mouth. Moreover, the positions chosen by GDPA on face images are in a close proximity of
the original face features. On the other hand, the patches generated on ImageNet (bottom

row) do not demonstrate a strong semantic meaning that is comprehensible by human.
These patch patterns look similar to the adversarial patches found by Brown et al. (2017).
We conjecture that this may be because ImageNet is a much more complex dataset than
VGGFace with 1,000 object categories; to attack an ImageNet model, more complex patterns
(e.g., superimposition of multiple object categories) might be required, and thus are harder
for human to comprehend. However, this hypothesis may be worthy of further investigation,
which we will leave to our future work.

Targeted Patch Attack
Table 3.1 (right part) reports the ASRs of different algorithms for targeted patch attack with
different patch sizes. For each of the three datasets, we choose the first class as the target
class, i.e., “AddedLine”, “Aamir Khan” and “tench, Tinca tinca”, respectively. Similar to
the results of untargeted attack, patches of larger sizes have higher ASRs than smaller ones.
GDPA achieves higher ASRs than other competing methods in most of cases.
Figure 3.5 visualizes the perturbed images of different patch sizes generated by GDPA for
targeted attack on VGGFace and ImageNet. It can be observed that the patches generated
for both datasets have clear semantic meanings. For example, the patches generated on a
VGGFace image look like eyes, mouth or beard of the target identity, while the patches
generated for an ImageNet image look like a fish, which is the similar to the target label
“tench”.

ASR(%)

𝜶𝜶

Figure 3.6 The impact of α to the ASR of GDPA on VGGFace.
Visibility α vs. ASR
We further investigate the impact of visibility parameter α of Eq. 3.6 to GDPA’s ASR.
The results on VGGFace are shown in Figure 3.6, where we consider different patch sizes.
As expected, when α increases, the attack strength of GDPA gets stronger for all different
patch sizes. Notably, when the patch size is 5% or 10% of pixels, GDPA can reach almost the
highest ASRs when α ≥ 0.6, indicating that when patches are sufficiently large, the attack
can be more invisible to attack a model successfully. Example perturbed images generated
by GDPA with different α are provided.

3.4.2 Dynamic Patch Adversarial Training
Next we validate the robustness of models trained by GDPA-AT against various adversarial
attacks. Specifically, we report the results of GDPA-AT trained models against patch attacks and conventional adversarial attacks, and compare them with state-of-the-art defense
methods.

GDPA-AT against Patch Attacks
Table 3.2 reports the accuracies of robust models trained by different defense algorithms
against two types of patch attacks: 1) eyeglasses attack on VGGFace, and 2) sticker attack
on Traffic Sign. As can be seen, PGD-AT, a well-established defense method for conventional
adversarial attacks, is not robust to either eyeglasses attack or traffic sign attack, which is
consistent with the results reported in Wu et al. (2019). While both DOA and GDPA-AT
improve the robustness over PGD-AT significantly, GDPA-AT achieves substantially higher
accuracies than the two variants of DOA.
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 shows example results when using eyeglasses attack to evade
a standard CE-trained model (3.7) and the GDPA-AT trained model (3.8). As we can see,
the eyeglasses attack fails to attack the GDPA-AT trained model because it is not able to
generate effective adversarial patterns on the eyeglass frames in 5 out of 6 cases, while being
very successful on standard CE-trained model.

Attack Iterations
0
100 200 300
CE Training
98.9 0.2 0.1 0.0
PGD-AT Madry et al. (2018) 97.3 37.7 36.9 36.6
DOA-Grad Wu et al. (2019)
DOA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
GDPA-AT

99.2 85.3 83.7 81.9
99.0 89.8 87.8 85.9
99.6 96.5 94.7 94.9

0
10 100 1000
CE Training
98.7 42.9 32.5 24.3
PGD-AT Madry et al. (2018) 97.5 57.6 45.1 42.5
DOA-Grad Wu et al. (2019)
DOA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
GDPA-AT

95.6 85.2 84.8 82.8
92.9 92.2 91.8 90.8
98.5 96.2 95.8 94.6

Table 3.2 The accuracies of different robust models under eyeglasses attack, and sticker
attack.
GDPA-AT against Adversarial Attack
Alternatively, we also evaluate the robustness of models under conventional adversarial attacks, such as the PGD attack Madry et al. (2018). The results are reported in Table 3.3,
where different PGD attack strengths ϵ have been considered. It can be observed that
GDPA-AT achieves significantly higher robustness than DOA against the PGD attack. More
interestingly, the accuacies that GDPA-AT achieve are almost on par with PGD-AT even
though GDPA is a patch attack algorithm. We believe this is because during the adversarial
training process, GPDA generates the adversarial patches to attack the classifier iteratively;
even though each patch attack is localized, the combination of all patch attacks generated
during the iterative process resembles a whole image attack that PGD usually produces. For
this reason, the model trained by GDPA-AT can defend conventional adversarial attacks.
These results demonstrate that GDPA-AT is a generic defense algorithm that can defend

Figure 3.7 Perturbed images generated by eyeglasses attack on standard CE-trained model
both patch attacks and conventional adversarial attacks, while PGD-AT and DOA fail on
one of them.

3.4.3 Ablation Study
3.4.3.1 Generate pattern vs p
Instead of generating pattern from the GDPA generator, we can generate p directly by
adjusting the output size of pattern decoder GP to 3 × w × h. Directly generating p can
simplify the pipeline of GDPA as we do not need to translate pattern to generate p in two

Figure 3.8 Perturbed images generated by eyeglasses attack on GDPA-AT trained model.
steps. Thus, it’s worth investigating which design choice works better. Table 3.4 shows
the results comparing these two design choices. As we can see, generating pattern achieves
significantly higher ASRs than generating p directly. We conjecture that this is because p
has a larger space to optimize than pattern, and thus is more difficult to optimize. Hence,
in our GDPA pipeline we generate pattern first and then translate pattern to generate p.

3.4.3.2 Visibility α vs. ASR
In Section 4.1, we investigate the impact of visibility parameter α of Eq. 6 on GDPA’s ASR.
Figure 3.9 visualizes some example perturbed images generated by GDPA with different α’s

Attack Strength (ϵ)
0
2
4
8
16
CE training
98.9 44.4 1.7
0
0
PGD-AT Madry et al. (2018) 97.3 96.9 96.6 96.1 95.8
DOA-Grad Wu et al. (2019)
DOA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
GDPA-AT

97.5 33.4 0.4
0
0
98.5 35.7 0.4
0
0
98.9 95.1 94.9 94.6 94.5

0
2
4
8
16
CE training
98.7 89.5 61.6 24.6 5.1
PGD-AT Madry et al. (2018) 97.5 95.8 94.6 92.9 91.0
DOA-Grad Wu et al. (2019)
DOA-Exh Wu et al. (2019)
GDPA-AT

95.6 91.2 79.5 46.9 6.7
92.9 89.5 77.1 42.8 5.8
98.5 94.7 93.5 92.2 90.3

Table 3.3 The accuracies of different robust models on VGGFace, and Traffic Sign when
under the PGD attack.
Generate pattern Generate p
Traffic Sign
87.9%
69.7%
VGGFace
46.3%
24.9%
ImageNet
96.3%
63.8%
Table 3.4 ASRs of GDPA when generating pattern vs. p.
and patch sizes. As we can see, by using different α’s, we can control the visibility of GDPA
attack.

3.4.3.3 Effect of β
The β in Eq. 1 controls the slope of tanh that constrains lx and ly in the range of [−1, 1]. It
is critical to find an appropriate value of β to train the GDPA generator. Intuitively, a too
large or too small β value can cause different training difficulties. If β’s value is too small,
the tanh activation function saturates quickly and pushes lx and ly to the saturated value
of -1 or 1, which corresponds to corners of an image. On the other hand, if β is too large,

1%

2%

5%

10%

𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟏

𝜶 = 𝟎.2

𝜶 = 𝟎. 𝟒

Figure 3.9 Perturbed images generated by GDPA with different α’s and patch sizes (1%, 2%,
5% or 10% pixels).
the tanh activation function has a slow transition from -1 to 1, which may not be able to
push lx and ly away from the origin [0, 0] of an image, and likely causes ineffective training
as well. Therefore, we treat β as a hyperparameter and tune it on the validation set. The
results with different values of β on VGGFace are shown in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.10. It
can be observed that we get the highest ASR with β = 3000. With small βs like 100 or 500,
the patch location saturates at the corners of images; With large βs such as 5000 or 7000,
the learned patch locations are close to the origin for most of the images. We find β = 3000
works well across a variety of architectures and datasets, and thus set it as the default value.

β
100 500 1000 3000 5000 7000
ASR 15.6 20.8 88.2 88.4 88.1 87.9
Table 3.5 ASRs of GDPA with different values of β. We use 5% of pixels as the patch size.

𝛽𝛽 = 100

𝛽𝛽 = 500

𝛽𝛽 = 1000

𝛽𝛽 = 3000

𝛽𝛽 = 5000

𝛽𝛽 = 7000

Figure 3.10 Perturbed images by GDPA with different values of β. The patch size is 5% of
pixels.
3.4.4 Generating Static Patch Attack with GDPA
Contrary to dynamic patch attack, static patch attack uses a fixed patch location for all
the images. To conduct static patch attack with GDPA, we set lx and ly to fix values
instead of generating them from GL . To compare the performance between dynamic and
static patch attacks, we conduct static patch attacks on VGGFace at 25 fixed locations
(lx , ly ∈ [−0.8, −0.4, 0, 0.4, 0.8]). We use patch size 32 × 32 (2% of pixels) in the experiment.
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Figure 3.11 ASRs of static patch attack on different locations. We use different colors to
denote ASRs in different ranges. Red: above 70%; Green: 10% - 70%; brown: below 10%.
Dynamic GDPA achieves 76.4% ASR in this experiment.
Figure 3.11 shows the ASRs of static patch attacks at the 25 locations. As we can see,
patch location is an important factor in the performance of static patch attack. Notably,
patch locations around the area of eyes have the best ASRs. The highest ASR we obtain
from static patch attack is 73.9%, while dynamic GDPA achieves 76.4%, demonstrating the
effectiveness of dynamic GDPA.

ϵ=6
81.5
VGGFace PGD
GDPA-ADV 82.6
58.3
ImageNet PGD
GDPA-ADV 60.5

ϵ=8
90.7
91.9
65.2
68.6

ϵ = 10
97.8
98.2
71.3
87.8

Table 3.6 ASRs of the adversarial attacks generated by PGD and GDPA-ADV.
3.4.5 Generating Adversarial Attack with GDPA
Thanks to its generic formulation, we can also generate conventional adversarial attacks with
GDPA by adjusting its pipeline slightly. To do this, we use a fixed mask of value 0.5 for all
image pixels, and update the generator to produce p of the same size of image directly. To
make sure the adversarial noise is within a small L∞ -norm bound, we multiple p by ϵ/255
such that the adversarial noise is bounded by ϵ/255. Finally, we scale the perturbed image
by 2 and clip its pixel values to [0, 1] to create an adversarial example. We call this GDPA
version of adversarial examples as GDPA-ADV.
We then compare the attack performances of GDPA-ADV and PGD on VGGFace and
ImageNet. The results with different ϵ’s are provided in Table 3.6, where the PGD attack
is generated with learning rate 10 for 20 iterations. It can be observed that GDPA-ADV
achieves slightly higher ASRs than PGD in all the cases considered. Some adversarial examples generated by GDPA-ADV on VGGFace are visualized in Figure 3.12. These adversarial
examples look very similar to the conventional adversarial examples.

𝜖𝜖 = 6

𝜖𝜖 = 8

𝜖𝜖 = 10

Figure 3.12 Adversarial examples generated by GDPA-ADV with different ϵ’s. Left: original images; Middle: adversarial noise scaled to [0, 1] for visualization; Right: adversarial
examples.
3.4.6 Cross Attacks and Defenses
In this section, we compare the defense performances of PGD-AT, DOA and GDPA-AT
when they are attacked by their corresponding attack algorithms. In this experiment, the
PGD attack uses ϵ = 8, and ROA and GDPA use 10% pixels as patch size. The results on
VGGFace are shown in Table 3.7. As we can see, PGD-AT achieves the highest robustness

under the PGD attack, but is not very robust under the ROA and GDPA attacks. On the
other hand, DOA achieves decent robustness under the ROA and GDPA attacks, but fails
completely under the PGD attack. Notably, GDPA-AT is the only defense algorithm that
achieves almost the highest robustness under all three attacks. It’s expected that GPDAAT would be robust under the ROA and GDPA attacks since both are patch attacks. An
explanation of the robustness of GDPA-AT under the PGD attack is provided in Section 4.2.
Attack PGD ROA GDPA
AT
PGD-AT
96.1 32.8 30.5
DOA
0
88.1 86.9
94.6 90.4 88.2
GDPA-AT
Table 3.7 Accuracies of adversarially trained models under PGD, ROA and GDPA attacks.

3.4.7 Additional Results on Targeted Attack
Figure 3.13 provides additional perturbed images generated by targeted GDPA attack on
VGGFace. The top row shows the target subjects, while the bottom two rows show the
perturbed images with different patch sizes. As we can see, the patches generated by GDPA
attempt to replace the corresponding face features with the ones from the target subjects.

3.4.8 Inference Speed
Besides the improved attack and defense performance of GDPA, another advantage of GDPA
is its superior inference speed to generate attacks over the optimization-based methods, such
as PGD Madry et al. (2018) and ROA Wu et al. (2019). To have a quantitative comparison in
terms of inference time, we evaluate the run-time of GDPA, PGD and ROA on the VGGFace

Target
Subject

2%
pixels

5%
pixels

Figure 3.13 Perturbed images generated by GDPA with targeted attack on VGGFace. Each
column corresponds to one targeted attack with a different target subject.
test dataset (470 images). GDPA needs one forward propagation to generate a patch attack,
while we follow the settings of ROA and PGD and run 50 iterative optimizations to generate
their attacks. As shown in Table 3.8, GDPA is about 40x faster than PGD and 47x faster
than ROA.

3.5 Conclusion

This paper introduces GDPA, a novel dynamic patch attack algorithm, that generates patch
pattern and patch location altogether for each input image. Due to its generic formulation,

Inference-time (s)
PGD Madry et al. (2018)
ROA-Grad Wu et al. (2019)
ROA-Ex Wu et al. (2019)
GDPA

108.31
129.42
248.82
2.76

Table 3.8 Inference-time comparison of different attack algorithms on the VGGFace test
dataset (470 images).
GDPA can generate dynamic/static and visible/invisible patch attacks. GDPA is end-toend differentiable, which entails an efficient optimization and easy integration for adversarial
training. We validated our method on multiple benchmarks with different model architectures. GDPA demonstrates superior ASR over strong patch attack methods, and the adversarially trained model with GDPA is more robust to both patch attacks and conventional
adversarial attacks. Moreover, GDPA is 40-50x faster than competing attack algorithms,
making it a highly effective attack and defense algorithm.
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CHAPTER 4
Neural Image Compression and Explanation

4.1 Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become the de-facto performing technique in the field
of computer vision He et al. (2016), natural language processing Devlin et al. (2018), and
speech recognition Battenberg et al. (2017). Given sufficient data and computation, they
require only limited domain knowledge to reach state-of-the-art performance. However, the
current DNNs are largely black-boxes with many layers of convolution, non-linearities, and
gates, optimized solely for competitive performance, and our understanding of the reasoning
of DNNs is rather limited. DNNs’ predictions may be backed up by a claimed high accuracy
on benchmarks. However, it is human’s nature not to trust them unless human experts are
able to verify, interpret, and understand the reasoning of the system. Therefore, the usage
of DNNs in real world decision-critical applications, such as surveillance cameras, drones,
autonomous driving, medicine and legal, still must overcome a trust barrier. To address this
problem, researchers have developed many different approaches to explain the reasonings
of DNNs Simonyan et al. (2013); Zeiler & Fergus (2014); Bach et al. (2015); Gan et al.
(2015); Ribeiro et al. (2016); Dabkowski & Gal (2017); Fong & Vedaldi (2017); Li et al.
(2016); Lundberg & Lee (2017); Shrikumar et al. (2017); Yang et al. (2018); Ish-Horowicz
et al. (2019). Intuitively, interpretable explanations should be concise and coherent such
that they are easier for human to comprehend. However, most existing approaches do not
take these requirements into account as manifested by the opaqueness and redundancies in

their explanations Simonyan et al. (2013); Bach et al. (2015); Dabkowski & Gal (2017); Fong
& Vedaldi (2017).
On the other hand, over 70% of internet traffic today is the streaming of digital media,
and this percentage keeps rising over years some string reflecting how you wish the entry
alphabetized (2019). It has been challenging for classic compression algorithms, such as
JPEG and PNG, to adapt to the growing demand. Recently, there is an increasing interest
of using machine learning (ML) based approaches to improve the compression of images and
videos Ballé et al. (2017); Prakash et al. (2017); Johnston et al. (2018); Nakanishi et al.
(2018). Rather than using manually engineered basis functions for compression, these MLbased techniques learn semantic structures and basis functions directly from training images
and achieve impressive performance compared to the classic compression algorithms.
Usually, neural explanation and semantic image compression are addressed independently
by two different groups of researchers. In light of the similarity between sparse explanation
to image classification and sparse representation for image compression, in this paper we
propose a deep learning based framework that integrates neural explanation and semantic
image compression into an end-to-end training pipeline. With this framework, we can train
a sparse mask generator to generate a concise and coherent mask to explain the prediction
of CNN; subsequently, this sparse mask can be used to generate a mixed-resolution image
with a very high compression rate, superior to the existing semantic compression algorithms.
This Neural Image Compression and Explanation (NICE) framework is critical to many real
world decision-critical systems, such as surveillance cameras, drones and self-driving cars,

that heavily rely on the deep learning techniques today. For these applications, the outputs
of NICE: prediction, sparse mask / explanation, and the compressed mixed-resolution image
can be stored or transmitted efficiently for decision making, decision interpretation and
system diagnosis.
The main contributions of the paper are:
• We propose a deep learning based framework that unifies neural explanation and semantic image compression into an end-to-end trainable pipeline, which produces prediction, sparse explanation and compressed images at the same time;
• The proposed L0 -regularized sparse mask generator is trained in a weakly supervised
manner without resorting to expensive dense pixel-wise annotations, and outperforms
many existing explanation algorithms that heavily rely on backpropagation;
• The proposed mixed-resolution image compression achieves a higher compression rate
compared to the existing semantic compression algorithms, while retaining a similar
classification accuracy with the original images.
• The proposed method is very efficient compared to the backpropagation-based alternatives, such as Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013) and CAM Zhou et al. (2016),
as our method only requires forward propagation of the generator network. Experiments show that NICE is about 23x faster than Saliency Map, 16.5x faster than CAM
and 2.8x faster than RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017). This makes our method widely
deployable in real-time applications.

4.2 Related Work

Our work is related to two active research areas of deep learning: neural explanation and
semantic image compression. We therefore review them next.

4.2.1 Neural Explanation
In order to interpret DNN’s prediction and gain insights of their operations, a variety of
neural explanation methods have been proposed in recent years Simonyan et al. (2013);
Zeiler & Fergus (2014); Bach et al. (2015); Gan et al. (2015); Ribeiro et al. (2016); Zhou
et al. (2016); Dabkowski & Gal (2017); Fong & Vedaldi (2017); Li et al. (2016); Lundberg &
Lee (2017); Selvaraju et al. (2017); Shrikumar et al. (2017); Yang et al. (2018); Ish-Horowicz
et al. (2019); Chen et al. (2018a); Bang et al. (2019). These methods can be categorized
based on whether it is designed to explain the entire model behavior (global interpretability)
or a single prediction (local interpretability) Carvalho et al. (2019). The goal of global
interpretability is to identify predictor variables that best explain the overall performance
of a trained model. This class of methods are crucial to inform population level decision for
rule extraction or knowledge discovery Yang et al. (2018); Ish-Horowicz et al. (2019). Local
interpretability aims to produce interpretable explanations for each individual prediction
and the interpretability occurs locally. Local interpretability is by far the most explored
area of explainable AI Simonyan et al. (2013); Ribeiro et al. (2016); Zhou et al. (2016);
Lundberg & Lee (2017); Chen et al. (2018a); Bang et al. (2019). The primary idea is to
measure a change of the final prediction with respect to changes of input or getting feature

attribution for the final prediction. Different local explanation methods implement this
idea in different ways. For example, occlusion-based explanation methods remove or alter a
fraction of input data and evaluate its impact to the final prediction Dabkowski & Gal (2017);
Fong & Vedaldi (2017); Li et al. (2016); Zeiler & Fergus (2014). Gradient-based methods
compute the gradient of an output with respect to an input sample by using backpropagation
to locate salient features that are responsible to the prediction Bach et al. (2015); Gan et al.
(2015); Selvaraju et al. (2017); Shrikumar et al. (2017). Other local interpretability methods
explain data instances by approximating the decision boundary of a DNN with an inherently
interpretable model around the predictions. For example, LIME Ribeiro et al. (2016) and
SHAP Lundberg & Lee (2017) sample perturbed instances around a single data sample and
fit a linear model to perform local explanations. RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) extracts
features from a DNN classifier and feeds extracted features and target label to an U-Net
like generator to generate saliency maps for local explanations. L2X Chen et al. (2018a)
learns a stochastic map based on mutual information that selects instance-wise informative
features. Built on top of L2X, VIBI Bang et al. (2019) selects instance-wise key features
that are maximally compressed about an input and informative about a decision based on
an information-bottleneck principle.
NICE falls in the category of local interpretability and aims to produce concise and coherent local explanations similar to Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013), RTIS Dabkowski
& Gal (2017) and VIBI Bang et al. (2019). But our method achieves briefness and comprehensiveness explicitly through an L0 -norm regularization and a smoothness constraint,

optimized via stochastic binary optimization.
The sparse mask generator of NICE is also related to a large body of research on semantic segmentation Long et al. (2015); He et al. (2017); Chen et al. (2018b); Papandreou
et al. (2015); Pinheiro & Collobert (2015); Bearman et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2019b). In
particular, our sparse mask generator is trained to maximize the final classification accuracy
of the mixed-resolution images without resorting to expensive dense pixel-wise annotations.
Therefore, it can be considered as a weakly supervised binary segmenation algorithm that
detects salient regions of an image. This is different to the existing semantic segmentation
algorithms that employ different levels of supervision, such as full pixel-wise annotation Long
et al. (2015); He et al. (2017), image-level labels Papandreou et al. (2015), bounding boxes Dai
et al. (2015), scribbles Lin et al. (2016), points Bearman et al. (2016), or adversarial loss Chen
et al. (2019b). Since the main goal of NICE is to provide a competitive or improved neural
explanation, in our experiments we mainly compare NICE with deep explanation methods
instead of segmentation algorithms.

4.2.2 Semantic Image Compression
Classic image compression algorithms, such as JPEG Wallace (1992) and PNG Sayood
(2002), have hard-coded procedures / components to compress images. For example, the
JPEG compression first employs a discrete cosine transform (DCT) over each 8 × 8 image block, followed by quantization to represent the frequency coefficients as a sequence
of binaries. The DCT can be seen as a generic feature extractor with a fixed set of basis
functions that are irrespective of the distribution of the input images. Compared to stan-

dard image compression algorithms, the ML-based approaches Ballé et al. (2016); Toderici
et al. (2016, 2017); Theis et al. (2017); Ballé et al. (2017); Johnston et al. (2018); Li et al.
(2018b); Nakanishi et al. (2018) can automatically discover semantic structures and learn
basis functions from training images to achieve even higher compression rate. All of these
ML-based approaches follow a similar structure of autoencoder, where an encoder is used
to extract feature representation from images and a decoder is responsible to reconstruct
images from the quantized representations. The main differences among these ML-based
approaches are the architectures of encoder and decoder. While the majority of these algorithms Ballé et al. (2016); Theis et al. (2017); Ballé et al. (2017); Johnston et al. (2018);
Li et al. (2018b); Nakanishi et al. (2018) employ CNNs as the encoder and decoder, some
others explore recurrent networks such as LSTM and GRU Toderici et al. (2016, 2017).
To the best of our knowledge, all of these methods are not sufficiently content-aware,
except the work Prakash et al. (2017) from Prakash et al. which is probably the most relevant
work to ours. While Prakash et al. adopt CAM Zhou et al. (2016) as the semantic region
detector, we develop a principled L0 -regularized sparse mask generator to detect the semantic
regions and further compress images with mixed resolutions. We will compare NICE with
Prakash et al. (2017) when we present results of semantic image compression.

4.3 The NICE Framework
Given a training set D = {(xi , yi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N }, where xi denotes the i-th input image
and yi denotes the corresponding target, a neural network is a function h(x; θ) parameterized

by θ that fits to the training data D with the goal of achieving good generalization to
unseen test data. To optimize θ, typically the following empirical risk minimization (ERM)
is adopted:
N
1 X
L (h (xi ; θ) , yi ) ,
R(θ) =
N i=1

(4.1)

where L(·) denotes the loss over training data D, such as the cross-entropy loss for classification or the mean squared error (MSE) for regression. The goal of this paper is to develop an
approach that can explain the prediction of a neural network h(x; θ) in response to an input
image x; meanwhile, to reduce storage or network transmission cost of the image, we’d like
to compress the image x based on the above derived explanation such that the compressed
image x̃ has the minimal file size while retaining a similar classification accuracy as the
original image x.
To meet these interdependent goals, we develop a Neural Image Compression and Explanation (NICE) framework that integrates explanation and compression into an end-to-end
trainable pipeline as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. In this framework, given an input image, a mask
generator under the L0 -norm and smoothness constraints generates a sparse mask that indicates salient regions of the image. The generated mask is then used to transform the original
input image to a mixed-resolution image that has a high resolution in the salient regions
and a low resolution in the background. To evaluate the quality of sparse mask generator
and the compressed image, at the end of the pipeline a discriminator network (e.g., CNN)
classifies the generated image for prediction. Finally, the prediction, sparse mask and compressed image can be stored or transmitted efficiently for decision making, interpretation and

system diagnosis. The whole pipeline is fully differentiable and can be trained end-to-end
by backpropagation. We will introduce each of these components next.
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Figure 4.1 Overall architecture of NICE.

4.3.1 Sparse Neural Explanation
To correctly classify an image, a state-of-the-art CNN classifier does not need to analyze all
the pixels in an image. Partially, this is because not all the pixels in an image are equally
important for image recognition. For example, although the background pixels may provide
some useful clues to recognize an object, it is the pixels on the object that play a decisive role

for recognition. Based on this understanding, we’d like to learn a set of random variables (one
for each pixel of an image) such that the variables on object pixels receive high values while
the variables on background pixels receive low values. In other words, we want to learn
a binary segmentation model that can partition pixels into object pixels and background
pixels. To make our segmentation discriminative, we require the output of our model to be
sparse/concise such that only the most important or influential pixels receive high values,
and the remaining pixels receive low values. Furthermore, we expect the segmentation to
be smooth/coherent within a small continuous region since most of natural objects usually
have smooth appearances. We therefore request our neural explanation model to produce
explanations that are concise and coherent. We will materialize these two requirements
mathematically.
We model our neural explanation by attaching a binary random variable z ∈ {0, 1} to
each pixel of an image:
x̃i = xi ⊙ z i ,

z i ∈ {0, 1}P ,

(4.2)

where z i denotes a binary mask for image xi , and ⊙ is an element-wise product. Furthermore,
we define zij the binary variable for pixel j of image xi . We assume both image xi and its
mask z i have the same spatial dimension of m × n or P pixels. After training, we wish zij
takes value 1 if pixel j is on object and 0 otherwise.
We regard z i as our explanation to the prediction of h(xi ; θ) and learn z i by minimizing

the following L0 -norm regularized loss function:
N

1 X
R(θ, z) =
L (h (xi ⊙ z i ; θ) , yi )+λ||z i ||0
N i=1

(4.3)

!
N
P
X
1X
=
L (h (xi ⊙ z i ; θ) , yi )+λ
1[zj ̸=0] ,
i
N i=1
j=1
where 1[c] is an indicator function that is 1 if the condition c is satisfied, and 0 otherwise.
Here, we insert (4.2) into (4.1) and add an L0 -norm on the elements of zi , which explicitly
measures number of non-zeros in z i or the sparsity of z i . By doing so, we’d like the masked
image achieves the similar classification accuracy as the original image, while using as fewer
pixels as possible. In other words, the sparse mask z i can produce a concise explanation to
the prediction of the classifier (i.e., the first requirement). To optimize (4.3), however, we
note that both the first term and the second term of (4.3) are not differentiable w.r.t. z.
Therefore, further approximations need to be considered.
We can approximate this optimization problem via an inequality from stochastic variational optimization Bird et al. (2018a). Specifically, given any function F(z) and any
distribution q(z), the following inequality holds
min F(z) ≤ Ez∼q(z) [F(z)],
z

(4.4)

i.e., the minimum of a function is upper bounded by the expectation of the function. With
this result, we can derive an upper bound of (4.3) as follows.
Since zij , ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , P } is a binary random variable, we assume zij is subject to a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter πij ∈ [0, 1], i.e. zij ∼ Ber(z; πij ). Thus, we can upper

bound minz R(θ, z) by the expectation
N

h
i
1 X
R̃(θ, π) =
Eq(zi |πi ) L (h (xi ⊙ z i ; θ) , yi )
N i=1
+λ

P
X


πij .

(4.5)

j=1

Now the second term of (4.5) is differentiable w.r.t. the new model parameters π. However,
the first term is still problematic since the expectation over a large number of binary random
variables z i ∈ {0, 1}P is intractable, so is its gradient.
4.3.1.1 The Hard Concrete Gradient Estimator
Fortunately, this kind of binary latent variable models has been investigated extensively in
the literature. There exist a numerous of gradient estimators to this problem, including
REINFORCE Williams (1992), Gumble-Softmax Jang et al. (2017); Maddison et al. (2017),
REBAR Tucker et al. (2017), RELAX Grathwohl et al. (2018) and the hard concrete estimator Louizos et al. (2018), among which the hard concrete estimator is the one that is easy to
implement and demonstrates superior performance in our experiments. We therefore resort
to this gradient estimator to optimize (4.5). Specifically, the hard concrete gradient estimator employs a reparameterization trick to approximate the original optimization problem

of (4.5) by a close surrogate loss function

N
h
i
1X
R̂(θ,log α)=
Eui ∼U(0,1) L(h(xi ⊙g(f (log αi ,ui ));θ),yi )
N i=1
!

P
X
−γ
j
+λ
σ log αi − β log
ζ
j=1

= LD (θ, log α) + λLC (log α),

(4.6)

with

f (log αi , ui ) = σ ((log ui − log(1 − ui )
+ log αi )/β) (ζ − γ) + γ,

(4.7)

and

g(·) = min(1, max(0, ·)),

(4.8)

where σ(t) = 1/(1 + exp(−t)) is the sigmoid function, LD measures how well the classifier
fits to training data D, LC measures the expected number of non-zeros in z, and β = 2/3,
γ = −0.1 and ζ = 1.1 are the typical parameters of the hard concrete distribution. Function
g(·) is a hard-sigmoid function that bounds the stretched concrete distribution between 0 and
1. For more details on the hard concrete gradient estimator, we refer the readers to Louizos
et al. (2018). With this reparameterization, the surrogate loss function (4.6) is differentiable

w.r.t. its parameters.

4.3.1.2 Smoothness Regularization
The L0 -regularized objective function developed above enforces the sparsity/conciseness of
an explanation. To improve the coherence of an explanation, we introduce an additional
smoothness constraint on the mask:
 X
w,h 
N
1 X
zim,n− zim−1,n
Eq(zi | log αi )
LS (log α) =
N i=1
m,n=1
+

zim,n−zim,n−1

+

zim,n−zim−1,n−1

+

zim,n−

zim−1,n+1



w,h
N
1 X X m,n m−1,n
≈
yi − yi
+ yim,n− yim,n−1
N i=1 m,n=1


+ yim,n− yim−1,n−1 + yim,n− yim−1,n+1 ,

(4.9)

where yim,n is the expectation of random variable zim,n under the hard concrete distribution
q(z i | log αi ), which can be calculated as:


−γ
.
y = Eq(z| log α) [z] = σ log α − β log
ζ

(4.10)

Note that this smoothness constraint penalizes the discrepancy of z among its four neighborhoods, and thus a coherence explanation is preferred (i.e., the second requirement). To
avoid notational clutter, in (4.9) some of the boundary conditions are not rigorously checked,
but we hope they will be apparent given the context. With this additional regularization,

our final objective is then a composition of three terms
L(θ d , log α) = LD + λ1 LC + λ2 LS ,

(4.11)

where λ1 and λ2 are the regularization hyperparameters that balance the data loss LD , the
capacity loss LC and the smoothness loss LS . It is worthy noting that from now on we
denote the parameters of classifier (discriminator) θ d to distinguish it from the parameters
of generator θ g that will be introduced next.
After training, we get log α for each input image x. At testing time, we employ the
following estimator to generate a sparse mask:
ẑ = min(1, max(0, σ ((log α)/β) (ζ − γ) + γ)),

(4.12)

which is the sample mean of z under the hard concrete distribution q(z| log α).

4.3.2 Semantic Image Compression
Upon receiving the sparse mask ẑ from above, we can use it to generate a mixed-resolution
image for semantic image compression, as shown in Fig. 4.1. Suppose that we have an input
image x and a sparse mask ẑ ∈ [0, 1]P , a mixed-resolution image can be generated by
x̃ = M (x, ẑ) = x ⊙ ẑ + xb ⊙ (1 − ẑ),

(4.13)

where xb is a low resolution image that can be generated by subsampling original image x
with a block size of b × b, which can be efficiently implemented by average pooling with a
b × b filter and a stride of b. Here b is a tunable hyperparameter that trades off between
the image compression rate and the classification accuracy of the classifier. In other words,

the larger b is, the lower resolution images will be generated and thus a lower classification
accuracy, and vice-versa. As we can see, when b = 1 the mixed-resolution image x̃ is equal
to the original image x; when we use the image size as b, the mixed-resolution image x̃
becomes a masked image with a constant value as background. When b is a value between
these two extremes, we can generate mixed-resolution images of different levels of quality.

4.3.3 Sparse Mask Generator
The learning of sparse mask z discussed above is transductive, by which we can learn a mask
for each image in training set D. However, this approach cannot generate masks for new
images that are not in the training set D. A more desirable approach is inductive, which can
be implemented through a generator G(x; θ g ) such that it can produce a sparse mask given
any image x as input. We model this generator as a neural network parameterized by θ g .
To integrate this generator into an end-to-end training pipeline, we model this generator
to output log α given an input image x; we can then sample a sparse mask z from the hard
G(·;θ g )

sample

concrete distribution q(z| log α), i.e., x −−−−→ log α −−−−→ z. With this reparameterization,
the overall loss function (4.11) becomes L(θ d , θ g ), which can be minimized by optimizing
the generator network θ g and the discriminator network θ d jointly with backpropagation.
In the experiments, we employ a CNN as our sparse mask generator as CNN is the de-facto
technique today for image related analysis.

4.4 Experiments

To evaluate the performance of NICE, we conduct extensive experiments on three image
classification benchmarks: MNIST LeCun et al. (1998), CIFAR10 Krizhevsky (2009) and
Caltech256 Griffin et al. (2007) 1 . Since NICE is a neural explanation and semantic compression algorithm, we compare NICE with the state-of-the-art algorithms in neural explanation and semantic compression. For neural explanation, we compare NICE with Saliency
Map Simonyan et al. (2013), RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) and CAM Zhou et al. (2016) via
visualization and the post-hoc classification. For semantic image compression, we compare
NICE with the CAM-based method proposed in Prakash et al. (2017), a state-of-the-art
semantic compression algorithm that is the most relevant to ours.

4.4.1 Implementation Details
4.4.1.1 Image Classification Benchmarks
MNIST LeCun et al. (1998) is a gray-level image dataset containing 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images of the size 28 × 28 for handwritten digits classification. CIFAR10 Krizhevsky (2009) contains 10 classes of RGB images of the size 32 × 32, in which
50,000 images are for training and 10,000 images are for test. Caltech256 Griffin et al.
(2007) is a high-resolution RGB image dataset containing 22,100 images from 256 classes of
man-made and natural objects, such as plants, animals and buildings, etc. Since MNIST
and CIFAR10 are low-resolution images, we use them mainly to demonstrate NICE’s perfor1

http://www.vision.caltech.edu/Image_Datasets/Caltech256/

s[th!]
Table 4.1 Network architectures of the generators and discriminators used in the experiments. Layer abbreviations used in the table: [C: Convolution; R: Relu; M: MaxPooling;
Up: UpSample].
Dataset
Generator
Discriminator
MNIST
C(1,1,3,1,1)
LeNet5-Caffe
CIFAR10 C(1,1,5,1,0) + M(2) + Up(2) VGG11 + FC(512, 10)
Caltech256 C(3,1,3,1,1) + R + M(2)
ResNet18
C(1,1,3,1,1) + R + M(2)
FC(512, 256)
C(1,1,3,1,1) + M(2) + Up(8)
mance on neural explanation. For the high-resolution images of Caltech256, we demonstrate
NICE’s performance on neural explanation and semantic image compression.

4.4.1.2 Network Architectures and Training Details
The network architectures of the sparse mask generators and CNN classifiers (discriminators)
used in the MNIST, CIFAR10 and Caltech256 experiments are provided in Table 4.1.
We pretrain three CNN classifiers (discriminators) on the three image classification benchmarks: MNIST, CIFAR10 and Caltech256 and achieve the classification accuracies of 99%,
90.8% and 78.3%, respectively. These classifiers are the target CNNs we aim to explain. The
architectures of the generators are tuned by us through extensive architecture search. The
hyperparameters λ1 and λ2 in the overall loss (4.11) are tuned on validation set to balance
the classification accuracy and sparsity/smoothness of the masks.
In the MNIST experiments, different λ1 s are used to generate sparse masks with different
percentages of non-zeros (sparse explanations). λ2 is set to 0 for all the MNIST experiments
as the algorithm can generate coherent explanations without the smoothness constraint. The
block size of the low resolution image xb is set to 28, which means a constant background

is used to generate the mixed-resolution images. We use the Adam optimizer Kingma & Ba
(2015) with a learning rate of 0.001 and a decay rate of 0.1 at every 5 epochs.
In the CIFAR10 experiments, the block size of the low resolution image xb is set to 32,
thus a constant background image is used to generate the mixed-resolution images. We set
λ1 = 3 and λ2 = 0.01 and train the pipeline by using the Adam optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.001 and a decay rate 0.1 at every 5 epochs.
In the Caltech256 experiments, we split the dataset into a training set of 16,980 images
and a test set of 5,120 images2 , where 5,120 images in training set is first used as validation
set for architecture search and hyperparameter tuning and later the full 16,980 training
images are used to train the final pipeline. The images are resized to 256 × 256 as inputs.
We set b = 256 to generate the lowest resolution images xb , and set λ1 = 5 and λ2 = 0.01
and train the pipeline by using the SGD optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and a cosine
decay function.
On different datasets, we experiment with different optimizers. The best performing one
is selected based on its performance on validation set. It turns out that SGD works better
on Caltech256, while Adam works better on MNIST and CIFAR10.

4.4.2 Explaining CNN’s Predictions
We first demonstrate NICE on explaining the predictions of the target CNNs we pretrained
above. To do so, we incorporate the target CNN as discriminator into the pipeline (Fig. 4.1),
and freeze its parameters θ d and only update the parameters of generator θ g by optimizing
2

20 images per class are included in the test set.
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Figure 4.2 The sparse masks generated by NICE, Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013) and
RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) on the MNIST dataset. The dark red color represents high
values (close to 1), indicating strong influence to the final decisions. By adjusting λ1 of
NICE, we can control the sparsity of the explanations.
the overall loss (4.11). The sparse mask z generated by the generator serves as the explanation to CNN’s prediction since the mask indicates the salient region that has strong influence
to the final prediction.

4.4.2.1 MNIST
We train the NICE pipeline on the MINST dataset to explain the prediction of the target
LeNet5 classifier we pretrained above. Fig. 4.2 illustrates example sparse explanations generated by NICE with different λ1 s (when λ2 = 0). As we can see, when λ1 increases, the
amount of non-zeros in the mask z decreases and NICE can produce sparser explanations to
the final predictions. When λ1 = 1, the explanations are almost identical to the input images, and when λ1 = 30, the masks identify sparser but more influential regions for the final

predictions. As a comparison, we also include the explanation results produced by Saliency
Map Simonyan et al. (2013) and RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) 3 . While NICE highlights
coherent regions over digits as explanations, Saliency Map, a backpropagation-based approach, identifies discontinued regions as explanations, which are quite blurry and difficult
to understand. RTIS can yield coherent regions as explanations but the regions identified are
overly smooth. Apparently, the explanations produced by NICE are more concise, coherent
and match well with how humans explain their own predictions.

4.4.2.2 CIFAR10

Original
Image
Saliency
Map
RTIS

NICE

Figure 4.3 Comparison of explanations generated by Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013),
RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) and NICE on some CIFAR10 images. The RTIS results are
from the RTIS paper. Compared to Saliency Map and RTIS, the explanations generated by
NICE are more concise and the boundaries of salient regions are much sharper.

We also train the NICE pipeline on the CIFAR10 dataset to explain the target VGG11
classifier we pretrained above. Fig. 4.3 compares the explanations produced by Saliency
Map Simonyan et al. (2013), RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) and NICE on some CIFAR10
3

CAM Zhou et al. (2016) does not perform well on small images, and we observe no published work
provides CAM’s results on MNIST and CIFAR10. We therefore ignore its results here as well.

images. The RTIS results are directly cited from the RTIS paper, and we apply Saliency
Map and NICE on the same set of CIFAR10 images selected by the RTIS paper. Due to the
low resolution of the images, it’s very challenging to generate reliable explanations. As we
can see, the explanations generated by NICE are more concise and the boundaries of salient
regions are much sharper than those of Saliency Map and RTIS. The superior performance of
NICE is most likely due to the L0 -norm regularization that explicitly promotes the sparsity
of an explanation.

4.4.2.3 Caltech256

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Figure 4.4 The sparse masks generated by NICE on Caltech256 images. The predictions
are correct to (a,b,c,d) and incorrect to (e). Even though the prediction is incorrect, the
sparse mask (e) provides an intuitive explanation why the discriminator predicts an image
of “humming bird” as “bread maker”.

Similarly, we train the NICE pipeline on the Caltech256 dataset to explain the predictions of the ResNet18 classifier we pretrained above. Fig. 4.4 demonstrates the sparse masks

produced by NICE for different images in Caltech256. As we can see, the generated explanations are very concise and coherent, i.e., the sparse masks are mainly concentrated on
the object regions, which align very well with our reasoning on these images. Additionally,
the generated sparse masks also provide intuitive explanations when the classifier makes
mistakes. For example, as shown in Fig. 4.4(e), the classifier incorrectly predicts an image
of “humming bird” as “bread maker”. The corresponding sparse explanation highlights the
influential regions contributing the most to the classifier’s prediction. Clearly, the classifier
utilizes both the regions of the humming bird and the bird-feeder for the prediction, and the
combination of the two regions confuses the classifier and leads to the incorrect classification.
Such an explanation is very useful for system diagnosis: it uncovers the vulnerabilities and
flaws of the classifier, and can help to improve the performance of the system.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates the comparison of NICE with Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013),
RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) and CAM Zhou et al. (2016) on the Caltech256 images.
As we can see, our algorithm highlights the whole body of object as the explanation while
Saliency Map typically identify edges or scattered pixels as the explanation. RTIS and CAM
can identify coherent salient regions of an image, however, those regions are overly smooth
and cover large background regions. Moreover, the saliency maps generated by RTIS usually
have some black grids in the highlighted parts, which are caused by the upsampling step in
the mask generator. Apparently, our explanations are more concise and coherent than those
of the competing methods, and can preserve semantic contents of the images with a high
accuracy. The superior performance of NICE on identifying semantic regions plays a critical

role in semantic image compression as we will demonstrate later.
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Figure 4.5 The sparse masks generated by NICE, Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013),
RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) and CAM Zhou et al. (2016) on the Caltech256 dataset.
NICE highlights the whole body of object as the explanation instead of edges or scattered
pixels as identified by Saliency Map, or overly-smooth regions as identified by RTIS and
CAM.
To evaluate NICE’s performance of identifying important pixels from an image, Fig. 4.6
demonstrates the evolution of classification accuracies on the Caltech256 test dataset when
different percentages of pixels are filled with random values sampled uniformly from [0, 255]
(a.k.a. post-hoc classification evaluation). We compare three different strategies of selecting
pixels for random value imputation: (1) Top-K% pixels sorted descending by log αj , ∀j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , P }, (2) Bottom-K% pixels sorted descending by log αj , and (3) uniformly random
K% pixels. Similarly, the same post-hoc classification evaluation is performed with Saliency
Map, RTIS and CAM. As we can see from Fig. 4.6, NICE identifies important pixels from
images as randomizing their Top-K% values incurs a dramatic accuracy loss compared to
random pixel selection or Bottom-K% pixel selection. The results of Saliency Map, RTIS and

CAM show insignificant accuracy loss when randomizing their Top-K% pixels, demonstrating
the superior performance of NICE on identifying salient regions.
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Figure 4.6 The evolution of classification accuracies on the Caltech256 test dataset when
different percentages of pixels are filled with random values.
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Figure 4.7 Sample ImageNet images and their sparse masks generated by the generator
trained on Caltech256. While the ground truth labels of (a, b, c) are included in Caltech256,
the ground truth labels of (d, e) are not in Caltech256. NICE is able to generate accurate
sparse masks for images in (a, b, c). But when the classes are not in Caltach256 the masks
are not very accurate as shown in (d, e).
4.4.2.4 Transferability of Sparse Mask Generator
The experiments above demonstrate the superiority of the sparse mask generator in generating concise and coherent explanations to target classifier’s predictions. This has been
verified in the case when the generator is applied to the test images from the same dataset.
Since our generator is inductive, it would be interesting to test if a generator trained from
one dataset could be applied to images from other datasets, which have similar statistics but
yet have some mismatch, i.e., the transferability of generator.
To measure the transferability of generator, we apply the generator trained on Caltech256
to the ImageNet images Deng et al. (2009). Although both Caltech256 and ImageNet contain
high-resolution RGB images, ImageNet contains 1000 classes which is 4 times of Caltech256’s

and the ImageNet images tend to be more complex than those in Caltech256. To feed the
ImageNet images to the generator trained on Caltech256, we resize the ImageNet images
to 256 × 256. Fig. 4.7 illustrates some sample ImageNet images and their sparse masks.
Images (a, b, c) are from the classes that included in Caltech256, while images (d, e) are
from the classes that are not in Caltech256. It shows that for the classes that overlap with
Caltech256, the generator can generate sparse masks that align well with the object in the
images, while for the images that are from non-overlapping classes the masks are not very
accurate, indicating the transferability of generator is class dependent.

4.4.3 Semantic Image compression
Finally, we evaluate the semantic image compression performance of NICE on the Caltech256
images. As a comparison, we also use the salient regions generated by Saliency Map, RTIS
and CAM for semantic image compression. In this task, two approaches can be used to
train the NICE pipeline: (1) Discriminator-fixed: given a pretrained discriminator, we
freeze its parameters θ d in the pipeline and only update the parameters of generator θ g by
optimizing the overall loss (4.11). In this case, the mask generator is trained to generate
sparse explanation to the original discriminator. (2) Discriminator-finetuned: similar
to discriminator-fixed except that the top few layers of the discriminator θ d are finetuned.
In this case, the discriminator can adjust its parameters to improve its predictions on the
mixed-resolution images, and thus higher accuracy and compression rate are expected. Note
that due to their specific training methodologies, Saliency Map, RTIS and CAM do not
have the flexibility of finetuning their discriminators, limiting their applications to semantic

Input Image

Block Size = 8 Block Size = 16 Block Size = 32

Saliency
Map

RTIS
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Figure 4.8 The mixed-resolution images generated by NICE, Saliency Map, RTIS and CAM
with different block size bs.
compression tasks.
As a start, we use the sparse masks generated by NICE, Saliency Map, RTIS and CAM
to produce a set of mixed-resolution images via (4.13) for visualization. Fig. 4.8 illustrates
some example mixed-resolution images generated with different algorithms and block size

Classification Accuracy

File Size(KB)

(a) Block Size

(b) Block Size

Figure 4.9 The evolution of (a) average file size of the PNG compressed image and (b)
classification accuracy as a function of block size b of NICE-fixed, NICE-finetuned, Saliency
Map, RTIS, CAM (paper Prakash et al. (2017)) and down sampling.
bs. As we can see, NICE generated mixed-resolution images are clearly better than those
from other algorithms. Thanks to the high accuracy of NICE on identifying salient regions,
even when the background regions are subsampled with a block size of 32, the discriminator
can still successfully classify these images. As a result, high compression rate and high
classification accuracy can be achieved simultaneously.
To quantitatively evaluate the trade-off between semantic compression rate and classification accuracy, we train the NICE pipeline with Discriminator-fixed and Discriminatorfinetuned

4

with b = 16 to generate sparse masks for each Caltech256 test image. After

training, we generate mixed-resolution images with a different b in {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64}. We
then use PNG Sayood (2002), a standard image compression algorithm, to store the gener4
For discriminator-finetuned, we set the parameters of Conv-4, Conv-5 and the FC layers of ResNet18 to
be trainable and freeze all the other layers.

ated mixed-resolution images and report the file sizes 5 . We also classify the mixed-resolution
images with the discriminators to report classification accuracies. As a comparison, the same
procedure is applied to Saliency Map, RTIS and CAM (paper Prakash et al. (2017)) for semantic image compression. We also include a baseline that uses down sampling in our
compression pipeline to demonstrate the importance of salient region detection for semantic
compression. Specifically, we use down sampling to generate low resolution images regardless
of salient regions of the images. When testing the accuracy on the down sampled images,
we upsample them to original resolution by bilinear interpolation.
Fig. 4.9 shows the average file size of compressed images and the corresponding classification accuracy as a function of block size b. As we can see, when the block size increases,
the file size of the compressed images decreases (higher compression rate) and the classification accuracy also decreases (lower classification accuracy), and vis-versa. The classification
accuracies of NICE-finetuned are significantly higher than the other four baseline methods,
meanwhile it achieves the best compression rate. When the block-size is 8, NICE-finetuned
achieves a 1.6x compression rate (87KB vs. 54KB) with a small (3.35%) accuracy drop
(78.30% vs. 74.95%), demonstrating the superior performance of NICE on semantic image
compression.
Comparing NICE-finetuned with down sampling, the results show that down sampling
hurts classification accuracy significantly because it uniformly drops pixels regardless of
5

The reason that we choose PNG Sayood (2002) instead of JPEG Wallace (1992) for compression is
because PNG is a lossless compression. Thus, the file size reduction of the mixed-resolution images can
be 100% attributed to NICE, and the possible artifacts introduced by JPEG, a lossy compression, can be
avoided.

Explanation Saliency Map Simonyan et al. (2013) CAM Zhou et al. (2016) RTIS Dabkowski & Gal (2017) NICE
Algorithm
Run Time (sec)
on 1000 Images
13.94(0.55)
9.87(0.48)
1.73(0.02)
0.59(0.01)
mean(std)

Table 4.2 Inference time comparison between NICE and the baseline algorithms. The results
are averaged over 100 runs.
their saliency. For example, when we down sample images with a factor of 8, it reduces the
average file size significantly (slightly better than NICE), but the corresponding classification
accuracy is only 30.83%, while NICE still achieves an accuracy of 74.95%. Therefore, the
mixed-resolution images produced by NICE can achieve a much better balance between
compression rates and final classification accuracies than down sampling.
Note that semantic image compression rate depends on the size of salient regions of an image. Given the large objects in Caltech256, the 1.6x compression rate means NICE uses 60%
pixels to achieve a similar classification accuracy. To achieve even higher compression rates,
other image compression algorithms Rippel & Bourdev (2017); Nakanishi et al. (2018) can
be used to compress NICE generated images further since our algorithm is complementary
to these compression techniques.

4.4.4 Inference Time Comparison
Besides the improved explanation performance of NICE, another advantage of NICE is its
superior inference speed over the competing methods. As discussed above, to generate
the sparse mask to explain the decision of a target CNN, NICE only needs one forward
propagation of the generator network, while backpropagation-based algorithms, like Saliency
Map and CAM, requires heavy computation of backpropagation to generate the salient

regions. Similar to NICE, RTIS does not need backpropagation at inference time, but it
requires to compute the feature maps of intermediate layers of the target CNN as the input
of the generator, which is also time consuming. To have a quantitative speed comparison,
we calculate the inference times of different explanation algorithms on 1000 images from
Caltech256. We run each experiment 100 times on a NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU and report
the average run-times in Table 4.2. As we can see, NICE is about 23x times faster than
Saliency Map and 16.5x faster than CAM, while being 2.8x faster than non-backpropagation
based RTIS.

4.5 Conclusion

We propose NICE, a unified end-to-end trainable framework, for neural explanation and
semantic image compression. Compared to many existing explanation algorithms that heavily rely on backpropagation, the sparse masks generated by NICE are much more concise
and coherent and align well with human intuitions. With the sparse masks, the proposed
mixed-resolution image compression further achieves higher compression rates compared to
the existing semantic compression algorithms, while retaining similar classification accuracies
with the original images. We conduct a series of experiments on multiple image classification benchmarks with multiple CNN architectures and demonstrate its improved explanation
quality and semantic image compression rate.
As for future work, we plan to extend the technique developed here to other domains, such
as text and bioinformatics for neural explanation and summarization, where interpretable

decisions are also critical for the deployment of DNNs.
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CHAPTER 5
Sparse Deep Neural Networks on Imaging Genetics for Schizophrenia
Discrimination (Joint work with TReNDS Center)

5.1 Introduction

Schizophrenia (SZ), as one of the most disabling psychiatric disorders with a lifetime prevalence 0.5%, casts a serious socioeconomic burden worldwide J. McGrath (2008). More
than a century after Kraepelin’s dichotomy was formulated, precise treatment is still not
available for SZ T. Insel (2010); Insel (2014). Current diagnostic and treatment practice
are largely based on symptoms whose relationships to underlying biological processes await
delineation T. Insel (2010); Cuthbert & Insel (2013). This gap underlies many issues faced
by the psychiatric community, including vague boundaries between defined clinical entities,
and heterogeneity within individual clinical entities. As a result, symptom presentations
often do not neatly fit the categorical diagnostic system, and one diagnostic label covers
biologically diverse conditions. These issues challenge treatment planning, which turns out
to be largely empirical Insel & Cuthbert (2015); Chen et al. (2019a). It has now been widely
acknowledged that objective biological markers are needed to quantify abnormalities underlying phenotypic manifestation, which allows characterizing disorders based on a multitude
of dimensions and along a spectrum of functioning, so as to improve patient stratification
and inform treatment planning B. J. Casey (2013); Cuthbert (2014).
Hopes have been invested in machine learning approaches as a solution to this challenge, given the complexity of SZ that has been well established in previous studies. Pa-

tients with SZ present widespread structural and functional abnormalities across the brain,
including gray matter loss in the frontal, temporal and parietal cortices and subcortical
structures E. I. Ivleva (2013), reduced fractional anisotropy in 20 major white matter fasciculi S. Kelly (2018), as well as abnormal resting state functional connectivity in default mode,
executive control and attention networks A. G. Garrity (2007); Woodward et al. (2011). In
parallel, genome wide association studies (GWASs) of SZ lend support for a polygenic architecture, where the disease risk is attributable to many genetic variants with modest effect
sizes S. Ripke (2014). These findings have boosted the efforts to model SZ in a multivariate framework, which is expected to not only delineate the relationships between individual
biomarkers and disease, but also to provide a generalizable mathematical model that can be
used to predict risk.
One straightforward approach is to feed voxelwise neurobiological features (e.g. gray
matter density) into support vector machine (SVM). With this strategy, Nieuwenhuis et al.
obtained a classification accuracy of 70% which was confirmed in independent data with a
sample size of a few hundred M. Nieuwenhuis (2012). It has also been explored whether more
sophisticated feature selection can be combined with classifiers to yield improved discrimination. For instance, resting state connectivity between networks extracted by independent
component analysis (ICA), followed by K nearest neighbors, yielded an accuracy of 96% in a
data set consisting of 28 controls and 28 patients, which were randomly partitioned to serve
as training and testing samples M. R. Arbabshirani (2013). In addition, fusion of multiple
modalities that may carry complementary information of the brain holds promise for further

improvement. In a work by Liang et al., combining gray and white matter features resulted
in an average classification accuracy of 76% in 48 controls and 54 patients with first episode
SZ, in a 10-fold cross validation set up S. G. Liang (2019). In contrast to neurobiological
features, genetic variables, such as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), in general suffer
modest effect sizes S. Ripke (2014) and could hardly be directly trained for classification. A
more commonly used feature for risk discrimination is polygenic risk score (PGRS), which
reflects the cumulative risk of multiple variants, and proves to be a generalizable and promising biomarker for disease discrimination and patient stratification J. Frank (2015); E. Vassos
(2017).
More recently, the advancement of deep learning methods has opened a new perspective
on elucidating biological underpinnings of SZ. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are known
to excel in handling high-dimensional data and automatically identifying high-level latent
features, which promotes them as promising tools for better understanding of complex traits
such as SZ. In one pioneer work, Plis et al. demonstrated the application of restricted
Boltzmann machine-based deep belief network to sMRI data. An classification accuracy
90% was obtained with a 10-fold cross validation in 181 controls and 198 patients with
SZ S. M. Plis (2014a). Deep discriminant autoencoder network has been proposed and
applied to functional connectivity features, and yielded a leave-site-out classification accuracy
of 81% in 377 controls and 357 patients of SZ L. L. Zeng (2018). A comparable leave-siteout accuracy of 80% was observed in 542 controls and 558 patients with SZ, when a multiscale recurrent neural network was applied to time courses of fMRI data W. Z. Yan (2019).

However, these approaches do not provide importance weights of original biological features
regarding their contribution to classification, making interpretation less straightforward.
As commonly implemented, DNNs are black-boxes with hundreds of layers of convolution,
non-linearities, and gates, optimized solely for competitive performance. While the value of
DNN may be backed up with a claimed high accuracy on benchmarks, it would be desired to
be able to verify, interpret, and understand the reasoning of the system. This is particularly
essential for the psychiatric community, for the purpose of deconstructing complex disorders
and facilitating improved treatment. In this work we introduce a sparse DNN model which
allows identifying sparse and interpretable features for SZ discrimination. The sparsity
is achieved with an L0-norm regularization on the input layer of the network for feature
selection. Under the L0-norm sparsity constraint, the model is trained to select the most
important features while retaining the high SZ classification accuracy. We applied the sparse
DNN approach on a large multi-site gray matter volume (GMV) and SNP data set for SZ
discrimination. In brief, a total of 634 individuals (346 controls and 288 patients with SZ)
served as the training set, which was internally partitioned for hyperparameter tuning. The
resulting classification model was then evaluated for generalizability on three independent
data sets (n = 635, 255 and 160, respectively). We examined the classification power of
pure GMV features, as well as whether combining GMV with SNP features would benefit
classification. And the performance of the proposed approach was compared with that
yielded by ICA+linear SVM. Empirical experiments demonstrate that the selected voxel
regions from sparse DNNs are interpretable and echo many previous neuroscience studies.

5.2 Materials and Methods

5.2.1 Participants
A total of 1,684 individuals aggregated from multiple studies, including MCIC, COBRE,
FBIRN, NU, BSNIP, TOP and HUBIN, were employed for the current study. The institutional review board at each site approved the study and all participants provided written
informed consents. Each data set was shared by the individual research group according
to their protocol. Diagnosis of SZ was confirmed using the Structured Clinical Interview
for Diagnosis for DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR. Table 5.1 provides the primary demographic information of individual study. The training sample consisted of 288 cases and 346 controls
from MCIC, COBRE, FBIRN and NU. Meanwhile, three independent data sets, BSNIP (n
= 635), TOP (n = 255) and HUBIN (n = 160) were used for validation.

5.2.2 Structural MRI data
Whole-brain T1-weighted images were collected with 1.5T and 3T scanners of various models,
as summarized in Table 5.1. The images of the training set were preprocessed using a standard Statistical Parametric Mapping 12 (SPM12, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) voxel
based morphometry pipeline Ashburner & Friston (2005); J. M. Segall (2009); C. N. Gupta
(2015); D. Lin (2017), a unified model where image registration, bias correction and tissue
classification are integrated. The resulting modulated images were resliced to 1.5mm×1.5mm×1.5mm
and smoothed by 6mm full width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A mask (average GMV
0.2) was applied to include 429,655 voxels. We further investigated correlations between

individual images and the average GMV image across all the subjects. Subjects with correlations < 3 were considered as outliers and excluded from subsequent analyses J. Chen
(2017). Finally, voxelwise regression was conducted to eliminate the effects from age, sex,
and dummy-coded site covariates C. N. Gupta (2015). While all the scanning parameters
would yield 93 dummy variables in the training data, we chose to correct scanning effects by
‘site’ before association analysis to avoid eliminating too much information due to unknown
collinearity. The validation images were preprocessed separately, using the same pipeline.

5.2.3 SNP data
The SNP data were collected and processed as described in our previous work J. Chen
(2017). DNA samples drawn from blood or saliva were genotyped with different platforms.
No significant difference was observed in genotyping call rates between blood and saliva samples. A standard pre-imputation quality control (QC) J. Chen (2013) was performed using
PLINK S. Purcell (2007). In the imputation, SHAPEIT was used for pre-phasin Delaneau
et al. (2012), IMPUTE2 for imputation Marchini & Howie (2010), and the 1000 Genomes
data as the reference panel D. M. Altshuler (2012). Only markers with INFO score ¿ 0.3

were retained. Polygenic risk scores (PGRS) for SZ were then computed using PRSice, which
was a sum of genetic profiles weighted by the odds ratios reported in the PGC SZ GWAS,
reflecting the cumulative risk for SZ of a set of SNPs. Specifically, the genotype data were
pruned at r2 ¡ 0.1 J. Chen (2017). Then a full model PGRS was computed on 61,253 SNPs
retained after pruning.

5.2.4 Sparse DNN
Figure 5.1 shows the overall architecture of our method, which contains three stages. First,
the GMV voxels are partitioned into a set of groups (or brain regions) with a pre-defined
radius. Then a sparse DNN model is deployed for feature (brain region) selection, followed by
augmenting the selected sparse regions of GMV with the SNP data for classifier retraining.
In the sequel, we will introduce each of these steps in more details.

Figure 5.1 Overall architecture of our method.

Given a GMV dataset D = {(xi , yi ), i = 1, 2, · · · , N }, where xi denotes the i-th subject’s
GMV image and yi denotes the corresponding label: case or control, we train a neural

network h (x; θ), parameterized by θ, to fit to the dataset D with the goal of achieving good
generalization to unseen test data. For a GMV image x ∈ RM ×1 , we use xj to represent the
j-th voxel of image x, where j = 1, 2, · · · , M and M = 429,655 in our study.
As the number of voxels M is much larger than the number of functional regions of human
brain (e.g., typically around 100 as defined by various brain atlases), we first partition the
brain voxels into a set of small regions, each of which is represented by a ball of a pre-defined
radius R. We enumerate all M voxels one by one: if a voxel hasn’t been assigned to any
region, we assign that voxel as a root to start a new region. After selecting a root voxel, we
compute the Euclidean distance between the root voxel and all the unassigned voxels. All
the unassigned voxels with distance smaller than R are then assigned into this region. We
then iterate this process over the remaining voxels to form next region until all the voxels are
assigned to one of the regions. We denote the k-th region Gk . After this preprocessing step,
we identify K regions, from which we aim to identify important regions for SZ discrimination.
Stage 1 of our algorithm is to prune insignificant regions from K pre-defined regions. We
formulate our region selection algorithm by considering a regularized empirical risk minimization procedure with an L0 -norm regularization. Specifically, we attach a binary random
variable z k ∈ {0, 1} to all the voxels in region Gk :

e = x ⊙ Az,
x

z ∈ {0, 1}K ,

(5.1)

where z ∈ RK×1 denotes a binary mask for brain image x ∈ RM ×1 , ⊙ is an element-wise
product, and A ∈ RM ×K is an affiliation matrix we construct from the preprocessing step

above, with element Aj,k = 1 if voxel xj is in region Gk , and 0 otherwise. For all the voxels in
a region Gk , they share the same binary mask z k , and k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}. This means if z k is
0, all the voxels in region Gk will have a value of 0, otherwise the value of xj is retained. In
the sequel, we will discuss our method that can learn z from training set D, and we wish z k
takes value of 1 if Gk is an important region and 0 otherwise. In other words, z is a measure
of feature (region) importance that we wish to learn from data.
We regard z as the feature importance weight for the prediction of DNN model h(xi ; θ)
and learn z by minimizing the following L0 -norm regularized loss function:

R ( θ, z) =

=

N
1 X
L (h (xi ⊙Az;θ) , yi )+λ∥z∥0
N i=1

N
K
X
1 X
1[zk ̸=0] ,
L(h(xi ⊙Az;θ),yi )+λ
N i=1
k=1

(5.2)

where L(•) denotes the data loss over training data D, such as the cross-entropy loss for
classification, ∥z∥0 is the L0 -norm that measures number of nonzero elements in z, λ is a
regularization hyperparameter that balances between data loss and feature sparsity, and 1[c] is
an indicator function that is 1 if the condition c is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. To optimize
Eq. 5.2, however, we note that both the first term and the second term of Eq. 5.2 are not
differentiable w.r.t. z. Therefore, further approximations need to be considered.
We can approximate this optimization problem via an inequality from stochastic variational optimization Bird et al. (2018b). Specifically, given any function F (z) and any
distribution q (z), the following inequality holds

min F (z) ≤Ez∼q(z) [F (z)] ,

(5.3)

z

i.e., the minimum of a function is upper bounded by the expectation of the function.
With this result, we can derive an upper bound of Eq. 5.2 as follows.
Since z k ,∀k∈ {1,· · ·,K} is a binary random variable, we assume z k is subject to a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter π k ∈ [0, 1] , i.e.

z k ∼Ber(z;π k ).

Thus, we can upper bound

minz R(θ, z) by the expectation
N
K
X
1 X
Eq(z|π) [L(h(xi ⊙Az;θ),yi )]+λ
πk .
R̃ ( θ, π) =
N i=1
k=1

(5.4)

Now the second term of the Eq. 5.4 is differentiable w.r.t. the new model parameters π.
However, the first term is still problematic since the expectation over a large number of binary random variables z∈{0, 1}K is intractable, so is its gradient. To solve this problem, we
adopt the hard-concrete estimator Louizos et al. (2017). Specifically, the hard-concrete gradient estimator employs a reparameterization trick to approximate the original optimization
problem of Eq. 5.4 by a close surrogate loss function



N
K
X
1 X
−γ
R̂ ( θ, logα ) =
Eu∼U(0,1) [L (h (xi ⊙g (Af (logα , u)) ;θ) , yi )] +λ
σ logαk −βlog
N i=1
ζ
k=1
=LD (θ, logα ) +λLC (logα ) ,
(5.5)

with


f (logαk , uk ) =σ

loguk −log (1−uk ) +logαk
β


(ζ−γ) +γ,

(5.6)

and

g(·) =min(1,max(0, ·))

(5.7)

where σ(t) = 1/(1 + exp(−t)) is the sigmoid function, LD measures how well the classifier
fits to training data D, LC measures the expected number of non-zeros in z, and β= 23
, γ= −0.1 and ζ= 1.1 are the typical parameters of the hard-concrete distribution. Function
g(·) is a hard-sigmoid function that bounds the stretched concrete distribution between 0
and 1. With this reparameterization, the surrogate loss function Eq. 5.5 is differentiable
w.r.t. its parameters.
After training, we learn logα from the dataset D. At test time, we employ the following
estimator to generate a sparse mask or feature importance weight:






logα
b = min 1, max 0, σ
z
(ζ − γ) + γ
,
β

(5.8)

which is the sample mean of z under the hard-concrete distribution q(z|logα).
After we train the sparse DNN with the L0 -norm regularization, we get the trained neural
b ∈ [0, 1]K over all K regions, with element ẑ k a
network parameters θ and sparse mask z

continuous variable that represents the importance of region Gk . Because of the sparsity
b are pushed to zero, which are
inducing property of the L0 -norm, many elements of learned z
considered as unimportant regions and thus pruned from the model. The level of sparsity
can be modulated by hyperparameter λ: the larger λ is, the sparser regions is identified, and
vis-a-versa.
In Stage 2 of our algorithm, we can further improve the accuracy of the classifier by
finetuning the DNN with the selected L regions from Stage 1 but without the L0 -norm regularization. To examine whether incorporating genetic features can improve the classification
accuracy, we also concatenate the PGRS feature to the selected voxels as the input of the
DNN classifier to finetune the classifier.
In our study, the training data consists of 634 individuals (346 controls and 288 cases),
which were equally partitioned into three subsets (each containing 33% of the samples). A
nested 3-fold cross validation was then implemented to identify the discriminating genetic
and neurobiological features and construct a classification model for SZ. The region radius R
we used was 12mm and each brain image was partitioned into 1111 regions as we described
above. In Stage 1 group selection and Stage 2 retraining, we used a DNN classifier with
2 fully connected layers of 200 and 16 neurons, respectively, and the Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) activation function. We performed grid search to find the best hyperparameters
for our sparse DNN model. In Stage 1 group selection, we used the SGD optimizer with
learning rates of 0.005 and 1 for model parameter θand logα, respectively. In Stage 2
retraining classifier, we used the Adam optimizer with learning rate of 0.005 for θ and a

weight decay of 1e-5. After the sparse DNN was trained on the GMV features, the regions
with nonzero ẑs were considered as important regions for the SZ classification. The selected
regions across 3-fold cross validation were highlighted for model interpretation. In particular,
we tuned hyperparameter λ to compare the classification performances with different levels
of sparsity, i.e. with 5 or 20 regions as predictors. In Stage 2 retraining, the selected voxel
regions were fed into the classifier and may concatenate the PGRS feature to improve the
classification accuracy. The model established in the training data was further evaluated on
three external data sets: BSNIP, TOP and HUBIN.

5.2.5 ICA+linear SVM
To compare with sparse DNN, we also conducted classification using linear SVM with components extracted by ICA as input. ICA decomposes data into a linear combination of
underlying components among which independence is maximized Bell & Sejnowski (1995);
Amari (1998). When applied to sMRI data, ICA essentially identifies voxels with covarying
gray matter patterns across samples, and cluster these voxels into one component L. Xu
(2008). It has been well established that ICA is a trustable model in the neuroimaging field,
yielding meaningful and generalizable brain networks which may not be captured by anatomical atlas V. D. Calhoun (2001); C. F. Beckman (2005); C. N. Gupta (2015). In the current
work, following the training and testing of the sparse DNN, we applied ICA on the GMV data
of 67% of the training samples. The resulting components were then fed into linear SVM
to obtain a classification model. This model was then assessed on the remaining 33% of the
training samples for accuracy. While the number of ICA components was a hyperparameter

to be tuned, we repeated the above process with different component numbers. The optimal model was then determined to be the one yielding the highest accuracy, which awaited
further validation in the three independent data sets. Echoing the sparse DNN experiments,
we also investigated whether having more GMV components as predictors would affect the
performance of classification. When genetic feature was further incorporated, PGRS was
treated as an additional predictor, which was sent into linear SVM along with the GMV
components. Note that genetic data were available only for TOP and HUBIN, such that
only these two data sets were examined for imaging genetic based classification.

5.3 Results

The performance was summarized in Table 5.2. When only GMV features were used for
classification, the ICA+SVM approach achieved the highest accuracy with 20 components
in the training samples. In parallel, the performance of DNN also started to saturate around
a sparsity level of 20 regions. It can be seen that for both ICA and DNN approaches, lower
error rates were achieved when 20 rather than only 5 brain regions/components served as
predictors. When less brain regions were used to train the model, the mean error rate across
three independent data sets was 35% for both ICA and DNN, though in specific data sets
discrepancies could be noted. When the classification model was allowed to incorporate more
brain regions/components, the mean error rate across three data sets decreased to 31.03%
for DNN models and 31.86% for ICA models. Specifically, the error rates were comparable
between ICA and DNN in HUBIN and BSNIP, while the error rate improved by 3.66% in

TOP when DNN was used. When PGRS was further incorporated for classification, the DNN
approach yielded consistent improvement in accuracy across all the data sets, either with 5
or 20 regions as predictors, where the decrease in error rate ranged from 1.41% to 3.94%. In
contrast, with ICA components were combined with PGRS for classification, the error rate
did not always decrease. The lowest error rate (27.75%) was observed in HUBIN, when the
DNN classification model used 20 brain regions plus the PGRS. The brain regions identified
by DNN are summarized in Tables 5.2 (5 regions) and 5.3(20 regions), and Figures 5.2 and 5.3
show the spatial maps of individual regions. Note that only the regions identified in all three
folds are listed. When 5 regions were to be selected as predictors, the three folds consistently
identified the same 5 regions, spanning inferior, middle and superior frontal gyrus, superior
temporal gyrus, as well as cerebellum. When 20 regions were to be selected, variations were
noted across folds, such that 13 brain regions were consistently identified. Compared to
those covered by 5 regions, cuneus, precuneus, medial frontal gyrus, and paracentral lobule
were also determined to be informative and included for classification. The importance
weights yielded by the interpretable DNN model were overall highly consistent with those
inferred from the original features, such that a positive/negative DNN weight indicated that
the region showed higher/lower values in controls compared to patients with SZ. The only
exception was region 27 which was identified in the 20-region model.

sMRI
sMRI + PGRS
TOP (225) HUBIN (160) BSNIP (635) TOP (255) HUBIN (160)
DNN (5 regions)
EER1
EER2
EER3
EER mean
ICA + SVM (5 ICs)
EER1
EER2
EER3
EER mean
DNN (20 regions)
EER1
EER2
EER3
EER mean
ICA + SVM (20 ICs)
EER1
EER2
EER3
EER mean

35.69
34.90
34.90
35.16

33.08
36.25
36.25
35.19

34.49
33.60
36.80
34.96

32.94
33.33
32.55
32.94

28.13
33.13
32.50
31.25

36.85
37.25
34.90
36.34

31.88
34.38
32.50
32.92

37.17
37.32
36.85
37.11

30.20
30.59
29.80
30.20

35.00
35.63
35.63
35.42

30.59
30.98
33.33
31.63

28.13
32.50
28.75
27.79

31.16
32.91
31.02
31.69

30.65
27.75
32.26
30.22

26.27
27.25
28.24
27.75

33.33
39.22
33.33
35.29

27.50
31.25
28.75
29.17

30.87
31.02
31.50
31.13

32.94
35.29
3.98
33.07

29.38
33.75
30.00
31.04

Table 5.1 Summary of classification error rates.
Region
DL87
DL382
DL493

Area

Uvula
Inferior Frontal Gyrus
Superior Frontal Gyrus
Middle Frontal Gyrus
DL555 Superior Temporal Gyrus
DL775 Inferior Frontal Gyrus

Brodmann Area Volume (cc)
*
47
10
10
13, 22, 41
9

0.7/0.0
1.9/0.0
0.0/1/2
0.0/0.9
1.0/0.0
0.0/1.0

MNI (x,y,z)
(-18, -81, -33)/(0, 0, 0)
(-54, 30, 0)/(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)/(27, 60, 9)
(0, 0, 0)/(34.5, 57, 9)
(-45, -30, 15)/(0, 0, 0,)
(0, 0, 0)/(57, 12, 36)

Table 5.2 Summary of the 5 important brain regions identified by DNN.
5.4 Discussion

An interpretable sparse DNN approach was proposed for application to medical data analysis
and its capability was examined on a large and heterogeneous SZ data set. The results confirmed that the proposed approach yielded reasonable classification accuracies, could identify
meaningful brain regions, and the interpretation of these brain regions was consistent with
that directly inferred from original features. Particularly, the proposed model appeared to

Region

Area

DL2 Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule
DL27
Cerebellar Tonsil
DL45
Cerebellar Tonsil
DL172 Superior Temporal Gyrus
DL260
Middle Frontal Gyrus
DL509
Inferior Frontal Gyrus
DL599
Cuneus
DL691
Middle Frontal Gyrus
DL805
Middle Frontal Gyrus
DL846
Precuneus
DL1008
Medial Frontal Gyrus
DL1017
Paracentral Lobule
DL1039
Middle Frontal Gyrus

Brodmann Area Volume (cc)
*
*
*
38
11
13, 47
18, 19
10, 46
9
7, 19
6
4, 5, 6
6

0.1/0.0
1.4/0.0
0.7/0.0
0.0/1.0
0.9/0.0
1.3/0.0
0.0/1.0
1.2/0.0
2.0/0.0
0.0/1.0
0.0/1.3
0.2/1.7
1.3/0.0

MNI (x,y,z)
(-7.5, -60, -54)/(0, 0, 0)
(-15, -55.5, -43.5)/(0, 0, 0)
(-12, -55.5, -40.5)/(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)/(48, 22.5, -19.5)
(-37.5, 40.5, -10.5)/(0, 0, 0)
(-42, 25.5, 10.5)/(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)/(18, -88.5, 19.5)
(-34.5, 46.5, 27)/(0, 0, 0)
(-45, 28.5, 39)/(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)/(30, -66, 42)
(0, 0, 0)/(7.5, -4.5, 63)
(-1.5, -40.5, 61.5)/(4.5, -37.5, 64.5)
(-21, 9, 67.5)/(0, 0, 0)

Table 5.3 Summary of the 13 important brain regions identified by DNN.
more effectively fuse imaging and genetic features for classification compared to ICA+SVM,
holding potential for data fusion.
The DNN models reliably generalized to data collected at different sites, with reasonable classification accuracies compared to ICA+SVM. The generalizability indicates that
the classification models are not vulnerable to scanning protocol, recruiting criteria, ethnicity influence, medication history, etc. Regarding performance, both DNN and ICA+SVM
approaches presented higher accuracies when more brain regions/components served as predictors, with error rates being 31.03% and 31.86%, respectively. The ICA+SVM performance
was comparable to those reported by Cai et al., where the authors conducted a comprehensive study on generalizability of machine learning for SZ classification using ICA-extracted
resting-state fMRI features, and achieved an external accuracy of 70% with transfer learning
procedures X. L. Cai (2020). Notably, Cai et al. emphasized the importance of assessing
models across sites and studies, while results based on a single study need to be interpreted
cautiously. This might explain why our classification accuracy based on a large and multistudy cohort is lower than some previous studies with smaller sample sizes or single-study

cohort S. M. Plis (2014b), indicating complex heterogeneity of patients with SZ. Increasing
sample size of the training data and incorporating other data modalities promise further
improvement.
The proposed approach highlights a sparsity constraint, which allows trade-off between
explained variance and interpretability of identified features. In general, a low level of sparsity
allows more features to be admitted into the classification model, which however results in
more variance across samples. As shown in the current work, when a higher level of sparsity
was enforced, the same 5 regions were identified across 3 folds. In contrast, with a lower
sparsity, 13 out of 20 regions were consistently identified, although the latter explained more
variance and yielded higher classification accuracies. It should be pointed out that, increasing
the predictors from 5 to 20 regions resulted in a decrease of 4% in error rate, which was
indeed not profound. In other words, although GMV abnormalities are widely present in
SZ, the identified five regions comprise primary and unique SZ-related disruptions in brain
structure. The samples missed in the classification, or missing variance, likely call for a larger
training data set to allow better capturing heterogeneity, as well as for information from other
data modalities, rather than simply adding more features from the sMRI modality.
SZ is a complex disorder, where genetic and environmental factors interact with each other
to affect brain structure and function which ultimately manifest into clinical symptoms.
With so many factors involved in the pathology of SZ, it is expected that multiple data
modalities need to be integrated to fully characterize the disorder. This also applies to
classification, which should capitalize on data fusion to extract complementary information

from different modalities. The proposed model holds promise for this purpose. In all the
tested scenarios, the DNN approach effectively fused GMV and PGRS features to yield
improved classification accuracies, indicating that the model reliably extracted SZ-related
variance in PGRS that was not captured by GMV. In contrast, no consistent improvement
was noted for ICA+SVM, where PGRS and brain components were directly fed into linear
SVM for classification training. The results appeared to lend support that nonlinear models
excel in delineating the relationships across different modalities in hidden layers and robustly
capturing complementary variance that is related to the trait of interest.
The brain regions identified by DNN are overall well documented in SZ studies. With
high sparsity, 5 brain regions were consistently identified across 3 folds, as listed in Table 5.2,
highlighting frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and cerebellum. All the five regions presented positive weights, indicating higher GMV in controls compared to patients, which was
consistent with the results of two-sample t-tests on original GMV features. SZ-related gray
matter reduction has been widely observed in temporal and frontal regions. A longitudinal
study by Thompson et al. revealed accelerated gray matter loss in early-onset SZ, with earliest deficits found in parietal regions and progressing anteriorly into temporal and prefrontal
regions over 5 years, the latter related to frontal executive impairments P. M. Thompson
(2001). The identified frontal and temporal brain regions have also been identified for SZrelated reduction in a comprehensive study on gray matter volume in psychosis using the
BSNIP cohort E. I. Ivleva (2013). The role of cerebellum in SZ has been revised in recent
years, where accumulating evidence suggests that cerebellum is also involved in higher cogni-

tive functions and cerebellar abnormalities are noted in SZ Andreasen & Pierson (2008). Gray
matter loss around the identified cerebellar region has also been reported previously T. F.
D. Farrow (2005).
With low sparsity, 13 brain regions were consistently identified by DNN across 3 folds, as
listed in Table 5.3. In addition to frontal, temporal and cerebellar regions discussed above,
parietal regions including cuneus, precuneus and paracentral lobule were highlighted. As
implicated in Thompson et al, while temporal and prefrontal gray matter loss were characteristic of adult SZ, parietal regions were noted for earliest gray matter loss which was faster
in younger patients with SZ P. M. Thompson (2001). The identified parietal regions also
echoed the BSNIP findings to show higher GMV in controls compared to patients E. I. Ivleva
(2013). Overall, it is reasonable that DNN prioritized to select temporal and frontal regions
for classification when high sparsity was enforced, which aligns with the notion that gray
matter loss in these regions characterizes adult SZ. In the meantime, when a lower sparsity
was enforced, parietal abnormalities were the first priority to be added as additional predictors which offered complementary variance. Among the 13 regions, region 27 was the only
feature whose DNN weights did not coincide with the inference drawn from original GMV
features. It was noted that the voxels in region 27 showed modest case-control differences
compared to voxels in other identified brain regions. We suspect the selection of region 27
by DNN might be driven by some hidden properties rather than group differences, which
explains the inconsistency in interpretation between DNN and two-sample t-tests. One limitation of our algorithm is that we assume the brain regions to be spherical, which we obtained

by measuring the Euclidean distance. This may not align with the optimal partition. And
we did not extensively investigate how the radius of brain regions would affect the performance. In the future, we plan to test whether defining regions based on a brain atlas (such
as Yeo atlas B. T. T. Yeo (2011)) would benefit the model training. Besides, likely due to the
limited sample size, the DNN performance saturated at 2 hidden layers. It remains a question how the performance would scale with increasing sample size. This awaits investigation
when more data become available. Furthermore, while the DNN approach holds promise for
data fusion, its capability of integrating multiple high-dimensional imaging modalities was
not examined in the current work, given that incorporating another modality would further
reduce the sample size. This will also be part of our future work. In summary, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study of DNN application to sMRI and genetic features
for SZ discrimination with generalizability assessed in a large and multi-study cohort. An
interpretable sparse DNN approach was first proposed to allow identifying, refining and interpreting features used in classification. The results indicate that the new approach yielded
reasonable classification performances, highly interpretable classification features, as well as
potential for data fusion. Collectively, the current work validates the application of the proposed approach to SZ classification, and promises extended utility on other data modalities
(e.g. functional and diffusion images) and traits (e.g. continuous scores).

Figure 5.2 Spatial maps of the five schizophrenia-discriminating regions identified by sparse
DNN.

Figure 5.3 Spatial maps of the 13 schizophrenia-discriminating regions identified by sparse
DNN.
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CHAPTER 6
Proximal Policy Optimization with Parameter-wise Smooth Policy

6.1 Introduction

Combining the power of classic reinforcement learning algorithms and modern deep neural
network techniques, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) is capable of training agents for
complex tasks with inputs of high dimensional observations, such as pixels Mnih et al.
(2013). It has proven that DRL is successful across a wide range of problems, including
game playing Mnih et al. (2013); Silver et al. (2016, 2017); Vinyals et al. (2019), robot
control Tai et al. (2018, 2017); Zhelo et al. (2018); Hwangbo et al. (2019), natural language
processing Hudson & Manning (2018); Wang et al. (2018); Wu et al. (2018), autonomous
driving Talpaert et al. (2019); Milz et al. (2018); Li et al. (2020), and recommendation
systems Zheng et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2019c), etc.
In recent years, there has been a considerable advance in the development of DRL,
which is verified in multiple simulation environments Bellemare et al. (2013); Todorov et al.
(2012). However, a large gap still exists for DRL to succeed in the real world because
of several drawbacks of DRL algorithms. For example, deep neural networks often suffer
from overfitting due to the large parameter space fitted with a small number of sampled
observations and actions; training algorithms are often unstable with unpredictable behaviors
by the learning policy due to lack of robustness and smoothness.
Among DRL algorithms, policy gradient (PG) Mnih et al. (2016) is a popular and effective
model-free on-policy algorithm. However, the first-order optimizer used by PG tends to be
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Figure 6.1 Our proposed method learns a parameter-wise smooth policy, which can improve
the stability of and promote sample efficiency of the PPO algorithm. Specifically, the policy
trained with our proposed PSP-O or PSP-L method gives a more robust decision output
when the policy parameters are perturbed by random or adversarial noise. As we can see
from the figure, the policy decision a′ (loss value Loss′ ) from PSP-O (PSP-L) trained policy
under perturbation is close to the a (Loss) from the original policy, while a′′ (loss value
Loss′′ ) from Non-PSP trained policy under perturbation is far away from a (Loss). PSP has
two variants: PSP-O puts the regularization on policy decision space, and PSP-L regularizes
the loss space.
overfitting and makes terrible updates to the model during training. As a result, it is difficult
for PG to estimate the correct step size to update the policy and balance the trade-off between
learning stability and learning speed. To mitigate this issue, TRPO Schulman et al. (2015)
and PPO Schulman et al. (2017) placed a constraint on the distance between the new and old
policies. Specifically, PPO applies a surrogate objective to regularize large policy updates,
such that in each iteration, the new policy is limited to a close neighborhood around the old

policy.
Instead of imposing a constraint on the distance between old and new policies during optimization like PPO, can we regularize the policy smoothness (distance between the current
policy and its neighbors) to improve the optimization? Recently, researchers have worked
on improving the smoothness of deep neural networks to solve the above issues of RL algorithms Raffin et al. (2022); Shen et al. (2020). However, existing works Raffin et al.
(2022); Shen et al. (2020) applying smoothness constraints to RL algorithms mainly focus
on observation-wise policy smoothness, which encourages the output of the policy to be
close when perturbing the observations. Notably, recent researches Foret et al. (2020); Chen
et al. (2021); Bahri et al. (2021) show that improving parameter-wise smoothness of neural
networks can improve the performance of deep learning models for CV Foret et al. (2020);
Chen et al. (2021) and NLP Bahri et al. (2021) tasks. Therefore, it is a significant limitation
that no current works apply the parameter-wise smooth policies to RL tasks.
To address the above issues, we propose parameter-wise smooth policy regularization in
this paper to constrain the distance between the current policy and its neighbors. With
this regularization during training, the distance between the new policy in the worst case
and the old policy is small in each iteration. For this reason, the proposed regularization
can improve the training stability of the PPO algorithm. Concretely, we make the following
contributions:
• We propose to improve the PPO algorithm by improving the policy smoothness (parameterwise robustness). This is the first time parameter-wise smooth policies are applied to

RL tasks.
• We introduce two variants of the parameter-wise smooth policy (PSP) algorithm: PSPO and PSP-L. PSP-O places constrain on the policy output, and PSP-L imposes regularization on the loss value. Both methods encourage the policy to not change much
when injecting small perturbations into the parameters.
• We apply the proposed algorithms to RL tasks with discrete (Atari games) and continuous action space (OpenAI control). Extensive results show that the proposed algorithm
can significantly improve the cumulative reward result on these benchmarks.
• As additional benefits of the PSP algorithm, we also show that the PSP method improves the exploration by increasing the entropy value of output distribution. At the
same time, PSP improves the parameter-wise robustness against random or adversarial
parameter corruption.

6.2 Background and Related Work

6.2.1 Reinforcement Learning Framework
Markov decision framework (MDP) is a classic framework to solve decision making problem.
MDP is based on two assumptions: 1, the environment is Markovian; and 2, the environment
is fully observable. Formally, MDP can be formulated as an agent interacting with an
environment in discrete time sequences in a quintuple (S, A, P, r, p0 , γ), in which S ⊆ RS is a
set of all observable states, A ⊆ RA is a set of actions, P : S × A → S is the state transition
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Figure 6.2 The overall pipeline of the proposed PSP-O algorithm. There are two stages of the
algorithm: the maximization stage and the minimization stage. During the maximization
state, the algorithm searches for a ϵ to maximize the distance between the current and
adversarial policies. In the minimization stage, the algorithm minimizes the original PPO
loss and the PSP-O loss to update the policy parameters.
function, r : S × A → R is the reward function, p0 is the initial distribution and γ is a
discount factor to reduce the impact of future reward.
The goal of a RL algorithm under MDP framework is to train an agent that can produce the trajectories that maximize the cumulative reward, which can be expressed as the
summation of expected discounted rewards:
"
max V (π) = Es0 ,a0 ,...
π

where s0 ∼ p0 , at ∼ π(st ), st+1 ∼ P(st+1 |st , at ).

#
X
t≥0

γ t r(st , at ) ,

(6.1)

6.2.2 Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO)
The PPO algorithm Schulman et al. (2017) is a on-policy RL algorithm that is based on
PG Mnih et al. (2016) method. The PPO algorithm is designed based on TRPO algorithm
by replacing the trust region method with the surrogate objective regularization. We briefly
introduce the TRPO algorithm before describing the PPO algorithm. The objective function
of TRPO algorithm shows below:


θk+1 = arg max E s∼ρπθk ,
θ

a∼πθ
k


πθ (a|s) πθ
A k (s, a) ,
πθk (a|s)



subject to Es∼ρπθk DKL (πθk (·|s)∥πθ (·|s) ≤ δ,

(6.2)

where Aπ (s, a) is the advantage function and ρπ (s) is the state visitation distribution. They
are defined as:

Aπ (s, a) = Qπ (s, a) − V π (s),
ρπ (s) =

X
i≥0

γ i P(si = s),

(6.3)

where Qπ (s, a) is the the state-action value function and V π (s) is the value function. They
can be expressed as:
"
V π (s) = Es0 =s,a0 ,...

#
X

γ t r(st , at ) ,

t≥0

"
Qπ (s, a) = Es1 ,a1 ,...

#
X

γ t r(st , at )|s0 = s, a0 = a .

(6.4)

t≥0

PPO simplifies TRPO using a truncated objective function to reduce the complexity and
allow it to use a first-order optimizer. The objective function to maximize in PPO is defined
as:

LP P O = LCLIP − λv LV F + λent LEN T .

(6.5)

The objective contains three parts: the surrogate loss LCLIP , value function loss LV F , and
the entropy loss LEN T . The LV F and LEN T is defined same with in the policy gradient
algorithm. The LCLIP is defined as:

LCLIP = E s∼ρπθk , [min(r(θ)Aπθk (s, a),
a∼πθ
k

clip(r(θ), 1 − ϵclip , 1 + ϵclip )Aπθk (s, a))],

(6.6)

where clip() clips the value if it is out of the bounds provided. By applying this function, it
removes the incentive for moving outside of the interval. The LV F is defined as:

LV F =


Eπ

s∼ρ

2
Vϕ (s) − r(s, a)

(6.7)

θt

6.2.3 Related Works
Parameter-wise smooth neural network is closely related to the concept of sharpness and
weight space robustness of neural networks. The earliest research works on weight-space
robustness is back to 1990s Murray & Edwards (1992); Hochreiter & Schmidhuber (1994).
Adding random perturbations on the neural network parameter is proved to be an effective
method to improve the training Jim et al. (1996); Graves et al. (2013); Srivastava et al.
(2014). More recently, researchers observed that the sharpness has strong correlation with
the generalization error on a large set of models Jiang et al. (2019). Followed the observation
of paper Jiang et al. (2019), Sharpness-aware Minimization (SAM) Foret et al. (2020) is
proposed to search flat local minima to improve the generalization performance. SAM uses
the gradient at a worse-case parameter point in the vicinity to update the neural network
at each iteration. In addition, SAM is essentially similar to the parameter-wise adversarial
training that can improve the robustness of neural network to parameter corruption Sun
et al. (2021). The difference between the PSP regularization proposed in this paper and the
above methods are: 1, We apply parameter-wise smooth network on RL tasks for the first

time; 2, We not only improve the smoothness in loss space, but also in output space for RL
tasks.
Even though there is no research on parameter-wise smoothness in RL field before our
work, smooth exploration and observation-wise smoothness has applied to RL in several
research works. Paper Raffin et al. (2022) adapts state-dependent exploration (SDE) to
Deep RL algorithms to imporve the smoothness of exploration. SR2 L is closely related to
this work; SR2 L Shen et al. (2020) applies a smoothness-inducing regularization to encourage
the output of the policy (decision) to not change much when injecting small perturbation to
the input of the policy (observed state). Results show that , our SR2 L effectively reduces the
size of the search space when learning the policy network and achieves state-of-the-art sample
efficiency. Compared to SR2 L, our work applies parameter-wise smooth policy, instead of
observation-wise, to RL algorithms.

6.3 Method

In this section, we describe two variants of parameter-wise smooth policy (PSP) algorithms
that improve the parameter-wise smoothness of the policy network in PPO algorithm. The
first algorithm, PSP-O, improves the parameter-wise smoothness with respect to the policy outputs (decision). On the other hand, the second algorithm, PSP-L, improves the
parameter-wise smoothness with respect to the loss value space.

6.3.1 Motivation
While it is appealing to perform multiple optimization steps on the policy gradient using
the same trajectory, empirically, it often leads to destructively large policy updates. To
mitigate this issue, TRPO proposed the trust region method, while PPO proposed the
CLIP Loss method. Essentially, TRPO and PPO are searching for a new policy that is
not destructively updated, or in other words, smoothly updated. Instead of constraining
each iteration’s optimization, can we regularize the smoothness of the policy network to
enforce the smoothness of policy updates?
With this idea, we introduce a novel regularization with two variants, PSP-O and PSP-L,
to improve the parameter-wise policy smoothness. The framework of algorithm PSP-O is
shown in Figure 6.2. As seen in the figure, we aim to train a parameter-wise smooth policy
in two stages in PSP-O: the maximization and the minimization stages. In the maximization
stage, it searches for an adversarial parameter corruption to disturb the current policy as
strongly as possible. In the minimization stage, it aims to update the current policy to
minimize the disturbance of the adversarial parameter noise. We propose to use two criteria
to measure the distance (disturbance) between the original and the adversarial policies in
this Min-Max process: distance in the output (decision) space and distance in the loss value
space. We call the methods with these two criteria as PSP-O and PSP-L accordingly.

6.3.2 Parameter-Wise Smooth Policy Regularization
Parameter-Wise Smooth Policy (PSP) regularization encourages the policy πθ and adversarial policy πθ+ϵ to be close to each other, where ϵ is the gradient-based corruption on the
parameter θ that maximize the distance D between the policy and the adversarial policy. We
apply a metric function D to measure the distance between the outputs of the original policy
and the corrupted policy. The parameter-wise policy smoothness can be computed by searching for the adversarial parameter noise to maximize the distance: maxϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ) D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ).
By minimizing this PSP regularization, we can improve the smoothness of the trained policy.
With this definition, our parameter-wise smooth policy regularization is defined as:

Rπ (θ) = max D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ).

(6.8)

ϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ)

In practice, D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ) can be measured with different approximation methods. We consider
two variants in this paper: the first one is Jeffrey’s divergence of the output of the policy
network, and the second one is the difference between the loss values of the two policies.
These two variants will be described in Section 6.3.3 (policy output space) and Section 6.3.4
(loss value space).

6.3.3 Parameter-wise Smooth Policy Regularization in Output Space
The first method we propose to approximate D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ) is to measure the distance between
the outputs (decision) of the original policy and adversarial policy. We call this method PSPO (PSP-Output). Specifically, we compute Jeffrey’s Divergence of original and adversarial

Algorithm 3: PPO with PSP-O
Input: initial policy parameters θ0 , initial value function parameters ϕ0 , coefficient
for value loss λV F , coefficient for parameter-wise smooth policy
regularization λP SP
for k = 0, 1, 2, ... do
Initialize ϵ
Collect set of trajectories s ∼ ρπθt by running policy π(θk ) in the environment.
Compute D(πθk , πθk ) ≈ Es∼ρπθt DJ (πθk (s), πθk +ϵ (s))
for j = 0, 1, 2, ... do
Update ϵ by: ϵj+1 = Bd (ϵj + ▽ϵ (D(πθk , πθk )))
Compute LP SRO with Equation 6.10
Compute advantage estimates, Ât based on the current value function Vϕk
Compute the PPO-Clip loss with Equation 6.6
Compute the value function loss with Equation 6.7
Compute the gradient:
g = ▽(θ,ϕ) (Lppo − λV F Lval − λP SP LP SP )
Update policy network and value function:
(θk+1 , ϕk+1 ) = (θ, ϕ) + ηg

policies as the distance measurement criterion. The approximation is shown below:

D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ) ≈ DJ (πθ (s), πθ+ϵ (s)).

(6.9)

During training, we compute the state transition distribution ρπ by the policy πθ , and take
expectation with respect to it. Thus PSP-O regularization can be expressed as:

LP SP −O (θ) =

Eπ

s∼ρ

θt

max DJ (πθ (s), πθ+ϵ (s)),

ϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ)

(6.10)

in which the Jeffrey’s divergence is shown as:

1
1
DJ (P ||Q) = DKL (P ||Q) + DKL (Q||P ).
2
2

(6.11)

PSP-O regularization encourages the output (decision) of πθ (s) to not change much to the
output of πθ+ϵ (s) when adding a small perturbation on the policy parameters. In other
words, it encourages πθ (s) to be smooth on all possible updating to πθ+ϵ (s) within the
neighborhoods. For this reason, PSP-O can effectively avoid destructive large policy updates
which hurt the training.
With the proposed PSP-O regularization, we can train smooth policy by incorporating it
into the PPO algorithm. To apply the PSP-O regularization to the PPO algorithm, we keep
the CLIP loss and the value function loss of PPO and discard the entropy loss. Formally,
the loss function of PSP-O is shown as follows:

LP P O = LCLIP − λV F LV F + λP SP LP SP −O ,

(6.12)

in which λP SP is the ratio of PSP-O regularization. Notably, with the PSP-O regularization,
we discard the entropy loss in the PPO algorithm. Algorithm details can be found in the
Algorithm 3.

6.3.4 Parameter-wise Smooth Policy Regularization in Loss Space
The second method we propose to approximate D(πθ , πθ+ϵ ) is to measure the difference
between loss values of the original policy and adversarial policy, which is called PSP-L
(PSP-Loss). Policy output (decision) smoothness is directly related to the exploration of
PPO algorithms, while loss value closely reflects the advantage value and is optimized during
the agent training process. For this reason, the loss value difference is a meaningful criterion
to measure the policy distance. With this alternative definition, the PSP-L regularization
can be represented as the below form:

Rπs (θ) ≈

Eπ [ max (L(θ + ϵ, s) − L(θ, s))].

s∼ρ

θt

(6.13)

ϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ)

With the above form of PSP regularization, we can derive the new loss function as follows:

LP SP −L =

π
Eπ L(θ, s) + Rs (θ)

s∼ρ

=

θt

Eπ L(θ, s) + [ max L(θ + ϵ, s) − L(θ, s)]

s∼ρ

θt

ϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ)

= max L(θ + ϵ, s).

(6.14)

ϵ∈Bd (0,ϵ)

We can see that this new loss function is essentially similar to the SAM algorithm Bahri
et al. (2021). The current policy can be updated by the gradient of the adversarial policy
parameters in the vicinity at each iteration.
To apply the PSP-L loss in the PPO algorithm, we can use the gradient of the CLIP loss

Algorithm 4: PPO with PSP-L
Input: initial policy parameters θ0 , initial value function parameters ϕ0 , coefficient
for value loss λV F
for k = 0, 1, 2, ... do
Collect set of trajectories Dk = τi by running policy πk = π(θk ) in the
environment.
Compute rewards-to-go R̂t
Compute advantage estimates, Ât based on the current value function Vϕk
Compute the PPO-Clip loss with Equation 6.6
Compute the value function loss with Equation 6.7
Compute the gradient of the current weight:
gcur = ▽(θ,ϕ) (LCLIP − λV F LV F )
Compute the gradient of the adversarial weight:
gadv = ▽(θ,ϕ) (LCLIP − λV F LV F ) |(θ,ϕ)+gcur
Update policy network and value function:
(θk+1 , ϕk+1 ) = (θ, ϕ) + ηgadv

with respect to the adversarial parameters to update the current parameter in every iteration.
Training Agent with this novel loss function LP SP −L can increase the smoothness of the policy
network in the loss value space. Algorithm details can be found in the Algorithm 4.

6.4 Experiments

We now validate PSP-O and PSP-L on benchmark datasets. Specifically, we evaluate the
performance of PSP-O and PSP-L on Atari 2600 games Bellemare et al. (2013) in Section 6.4.1 and OpenAI gym control environments Todorov et al. (2012) in Section 6.4.2. We
also evaluate the parameter-wise robustness in Section 6.4.3 and conduct ablation studies in
other sections to show the insights and advantages of the proposed algorithms. Benchmark

datasets, network structures, and training procedure details can be found in the Appendix.
Our source code is provided as a part of supplementary materials.
PPO
Alien
1307
Amidar
1280
Assault
10596
Asterix
13203
Asteroids
2393
Atlantis
2866108
BankHeist
1285
BattleZone
29475
BeamRider
6235
Bowling
56
Boxing
96
Breakout
425
Centipede
3895
ChopperCommand
1047
CrazyClimber
121540
DemonAttack
89663
DoubleDunk
-2
Endura
1163
FishingDerby
35
Freeway
32
Frostbite
319
Gopher
12050
Gravitar
1156
IceHockey
-3
Jamesbond
1225
Kangaroo
13607
Krull
8610
KungFuMaster
33078
MontezumaRevenge
44
MsPacman
4235
NameThisGame
8800
Pitfall
0
Pong
20
PrivateEye
108
Qbert
21697
Riverraid
12340
RoadRunner
55412
Robotank
21
Seaquest
1868
SpaceInvaders
2511
StarGunner
62789
Tennis
-2
TimePilot
11650
Tutankham
198
UpNDown
532388
Venture
7
VideoPinball
186256
WizardOfWor
9710
Zaxxon
13953
Winning Games Number
8

PSP-O PSP-L
4697
4314
1297
1188
11622
12832
29185
21827
2412
2278
3238262 3571303
1243
1248
30376
38245
8325
8214
42
68
98
98
417
465
6372
5655
1007
1111
123490 129824
114291 184582
-1
-1
1167
1259
48
28
33
33
9228
3968
12939
17550
2259
1184
-4
-3
8925
4401
1797
14383
8828
9236
38326
53388
2
2
6407
5348
6235
6094
-11
0
20
20
109
99
26960
26725
13252
13435
52219
36946
26
0
1916
1836
2824
2730
84777
77881
-3
-1
13190
12916
177
167
684425 399486
12
2
168582 177764
10137
9612
19028
15691
25
20

Table 6.1 Maximum cumulative reward score of Atari games. The last row reports the
number of games each algorithm achieves the highest score.
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Figure 6.3 Training curves of PPO, PSP-O and PSP-L on 49 Atari games.
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6.4.1 Results on the Atari Games
We first evaluate the performance of PSP on Atari games, which have pixels as high dimensional observations. We train policies on each game with three different seeds and report the
average cumulative rewards in this section.
In Figure 6.3, we show the cumulative rewards during the training process with PPO,
PSP-O, and PSP-L. We report the maximum testing cumulative reward of the three algorithms during the training process in Table 6.1. It can be observed that PSP-O and PSP-L
can achieve higher cumulative rewards than PPO in most Atari games. In total, there are
only 8 out of 49 games in which PPO gets the best results, while PSP-O “won” in 25 games
and PSP-L “won” in 20 games.

6.4.2 Results in Continuous Domain: OpenAI Gym Control Tasks
We further evaluate the performance of PSP-O and PSP-L on tasks in the continuous domain.
We choose four tasks from the OpenAI gym control environments with the MuJoCo physics
simulator. Same as in Atari experiments, we train policies with three different seeds and
report the average cumulative rewards. A detailed description of these four environments
can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 6.4 shows the cumulative reward curves during the training process of PPO, PSPO, and PSP-L in environments Ant-v3, Waker2d-v3, Halfcheetah-v3, and Swimmer-v3. As
we can see, PSP-O and PSP-L learn better policies with significantly higher cumulative rewards. Specifically, PSP-O or PSP-L achieves better maximum reward than PPO on all four

tasks. Furthermore, PSP-O and PSP-L have faster training speed and need fewer number of
iterations to achieve the maximum reward thanks to the improved sample efficiency enabled
by high entropy output exploration.
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Figure 6.4 Training curves of PPO, PSP-O, and PSP-L. PSP-O and PSP-L learn better
policies than PPO with significant improvements in terms of accumulated rewards.
6.4.3 Parameter-wise Policy Robustness
Parameter-wise smoothness is closely related to the model robustness against parameter
corruption Foret et al. (2020); Sun et al. (2021). Although PSP is motivated by improving
the parameter-wise smoothness of policies, we demonstrate that PSP also improves the
robustness of the policy against both random and adversarial parameter corruption attacks.

To evaluate the parameter-wise robustness of policies, we apply two types of policy parameter corruption: random attack and adversarial attack. For random parameter corruption,
we add noise uniformly sampled from Bd (0, ϵ) = {δ : ∥δ∥∞ ≤ ϵ} to the parameters; for
adversarial parameter corruption, we apply projected gradient descent on the original policy
on every iteration during the evaluation, by solving δ̃ = arg maxδ∈Bd (0,ϵ) D(πθ (s), πθ+ϵ (s)).
Figure 6.5 shows the evaluation result. As we can see, the reward decreases as we increase
the attack strength for both random and adversarial attacks on PPO, PSP-O, and PSP-L.
However, the cumulative rewards of policies trained by PSP-O and PSP-L decrease much
slower than policies trained by PPO against both attacks. This observation demonstrates
the improved parameter-wise robustness of PSP-O and PSP-L.
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Figure 6.5 Comparison of the cumulative rewards of PPO, PSP-O, and PSP-L under random
(left) and adversarial (right) parameter corruption attack in Walker2d environment. The
result shows that policies trained with PSP-O and PSP-L are more robust than policies
trained with PPO under both parameter corruption attacks.
6.4.4 Entropy of Policy Outputs
In this section, we show that policy trained with PSP has higher output entropy than policy
trained with PPO, even though no policy output entropy loss is applied in PSP. In other

words, PSP regularization can promote higher entropy by improving the parameter-wise
policy smoothness. With high output entropy, PSP can enhance the exploration by avoiding
situations where the agents fall into local optimum Haarnoja et al. (2018).
In Figure 6.6, we show the comparison of the entropy values of policy output distribution between PPO and PSP on two Atari games (Alien and Asterix) during the training
process. As we can see, PSP-O and PSP-L learn policies with large output entropy, which is
significantly higher than that of the policies trained with PPO with an explicit entropy loss.
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Figure 6.6 Entropy value of output distribution from the policies trained by PPO, PSP-O,
and PSP-L. We show the results of two Atari games (Alien and Asterix) along the training
process. It can be observed that PSP-O and PSP-L can train policies with higher entropy,
even though PSP-O and PSP-L do not use the entropy loss during training.

6.4.5 Parameter-wise Loss Landscape Visualization
Following the paper Li et al. (2018a), we visualize the loss landscape of the learned agents
of PPO and PSP-L algorithms. Policy networks have a large number of parameters, and
thus the loss function is in a high-dimensional space. For visualization, we attempt to use
2D plots as the landscape of policy network loss.

Similar to paper Li et al. (2018a), to plot 2D visualization of loss landscape around the
current policy, we use the parameters of current policy network θ∗ as the center point, and
randomly choose two directions: δ and η; we then plot a function of the form: f (α, β) =
L(θ∗ + αδ + βη), where L denotes the loss function.
In Figure 6.7, we plot the landscape of models trained with PPO and PSP-L on Atari
game Asteroids. As we can see, the model trained with PPO has a sharper local minimum than the model trained with PSP-L. In other words, PSP-L can train parameter-wise
smoother policy networks than PPO.

Loss Landscape of PPO Model

Loss Landscape of PSP-L Model

Figure 6.7 Visualizing the loss landscapes Li et al. (2018a) of different policy networks trained
by PPO (left) and PSP-L(right). Note the significant scale differences of the y-axis, indicating
PSP-L learns a policy that is parameter-wise smoother in the loss space.
6.5 Conclusion

This paper introduces parameter-wise smooth policy (PSP) regularization for PPO to promote the training stability and sample efficiency (thanks to improved exploration). Two
types of parameter-wise policy smoothness are introduced. PSP-O encourages small changes

in the output decision space when inserting bounded perturbations to the parameters of policy networks. On the other hand, PSP-L encourages small changes in the loss values when
perturbing the policy parameters. To investigate the effectiveness of PSP-O and PSP-L,
we examine them on well-established RL benchmarks with discrete and continuous action
spaces. Empirical results show that PSP significantly improve the cumulative rewards and
parameter-wise robustness.
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Future Works

7.1 Observation-wise and Parameter-wise Smooth (Robust) Policy

In PSP, we proposed to use the parameter-wise smooth policy to improve the PPO algorithms. On the other hand, recent researches show that observation-wise smooth policy can
also improve the performance of RL algorithms. A promising direction for the following
work to PSP is to incorporate observation-wise smoothness into the PSP framework. In
other words, we can apply policy networks that are smooth to both observation and parameter perturbation to RL algorithms. Ideally, this can produce an agent model that is robust
to both observation and parameter perturbation.

7.2 Combining the Output Space and Loss Space Parameter-wise Smoothness
(Robustness)

In the PSP paper, we proposed two effective parameter-wise smoothness algorithms, PSP-O
and PSP-L. PSP-O encourages small changes in the output decision space when inserting
bounded perturbations into the parameters of policy networks. On the other hand, PSP-L
encourages small changes in the loss values when perturbing the policy parameters. Can we
combine these two methods to make the policy to be smooth in both output and loss space?
This should be a promising direction to improve the current PSP algorithm.

7.3 Parameter-wise Smoothness (Robustness) Training in Output Space

y
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Conclusion

In this dissertation, we comprehensively study and propose a series of works on robust and
interpretable deep learning algorithms in both computer vision and reinforcement learning
areas.
The first algorithm proposed in this dissertation is a purification-based adversarial defense
algorithm: Defense-VAE. Defense-VAE is a simple yet effective defense algorithm that uses a
variational autoencoder (VAE) to purge adversarial perturbations from contaminated images.
The proposed method is generic and can defend white-box and black-box attacks without
retraining the original CNN classifiers. It can further strengthen the defense by retraining
CNN or end-to-end finetuning the whole pipeline.
The second algorithm proposed in this dissertation, GDPA, is a novel patch attack and
adversarial training algorithm. GDPA is an end-to-end patch attack algorithm, Generative
Dynamic Patch Attack (GDPA), which generates both patch pattern and patch location
adversarially for each input image. We show that GDPA is a generic attack framework that
can produce dynamic/static and visible/invisible patches with a few configuration changes.
The third algorithm, NICE, is a generative interpretation algorithm on deep neural networks. Compared to many existing explanation algorithms that heavily rely on backpropagation, the sparse masks generated by NICE are much more concise and coherent and align well
with human intuitions. With the sparse masks, the proposed mixed-resolution image compression achieves higher compression rates compared to the existing semantic compression

algorithms while retaining similar classification accuracies.
The fourth work SDNN in this dissertation is an interpretable sparse DNN algorithm on
MRI and Gene data. SDNN is a sparse deep neural network approach to identify sparse
and interpretable features for schizophrenia (SZ) discrimination. An L0-norm regularization
is implemented on the network’s input layer for sparse feature selection, which can later
be interpreted based on importance weights. We applied the proposed approach on a large
multi-study cohort (N = 1,684) with gray matter volume (GMV) and single nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP) data for SZ discrimination.
The last work, PSP, proposed in this dissertation is parameter-wise adversarial training
in the reinforcement learning area. PSP trains a parameter-wise smooth policy network in
PPO to tackle these challenges. Specifically, we introduce a Parameter-wise Smooth Policy
(PSP) regularization to enforce the outputs of a policy or loss values not to change much
when injecting small perturbations to the parameters of policy networks. With the PSP
regularization, we improve the stability of PPO and promote sample efficiency by learning
policies with high entropy outputs for exploration, thus improving the cumulative rewards
and robustness against random and adversarial parameter corruption.
As for future works, I believe the following three directions are worthy of further investigation: 1) How to apply policy networks that are smooth (robust) to both observation and
parameter perturbation to RL algorithms; 2) How to combine PSP-O and PSP-L to make
the policy to be smooth (robust) in both output and loss space; 3) How to extend output
space smoothness (robustness) to tasks other than RL areas.

156
CHAPTER 8
REFERENCES

A. G. Garrity, e. a. 2007, Am J Psychiat
Akhtar, N., Liu, J., & Mian, A. 2017, Defense against Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Akhtar, N., Liu, J., & Mian, A. 2018, in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition
Amari, S. 1998, Neural Comput
Andreasen, N. C., & Pierson, R. 2008, Biol Psychiat
Ashburner, J., & Friston, K. J. 2005, Neuroimage
B. J. Casey, e. a. 2013, Nat Rev Neurosci
B. T. T. Yeo, e. a. 2011, J Neurophysiol
Bach, S., Binder, A., Montavon, G., Klauschen, F., Müller, K.-R., & Samek, W. 2015, PloS
one, 10
Bahri, D., Mobahi, H., & Tay, Y. 2021, arXiv preprint arXiv:2110.08529
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